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In analyzing Mau Mau movement we roust understand the political map
of Africa. Kenya Is bounded In the north by the Sudan and Ethiopia and
In the east by Somalia and the Indian Ocean. To the west Is Uganda and
to the south Tanzania, formerly Tanganyika. The country Is divided Into
two unequal parts by the Equator.
Kenya, t«h1ch today covers an area of about 225,000 square miles —
roughly the size of France or less than the state of Texas, but bigger
than any other state In the United States can be divided Into four natural
zones:
1. A coastal zone. In size a little more than one per cent of the
total area of the country. It has a tropical climate and fair rainfall.
Agriculture Is possible and It has been practiced for generations by the
Africans who live there.
2. There Is to the west and north of the coastal area a great dry
region or zone which covers more than four-fifths of the country. It Is
poorly watered. The greater part Is pure desert. Before the British
occupation. It supported only a few nomadic communities (tribes) — Somalia
for the most part — who lived by herding their cattle. These nomadic
communities are the oialn Inhabitants of the area today also.
3. Highland regions or zones He In the southwest of the country —
an area of highlands covering about 13 percent of the total area of the
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country. It is approached from the coastal area by way of steppe land,
which gives way with rising altitude to temperate forest and evergreen
pasture. The climate is moderate and the area watered in its most favor¬
able parts by streams and twice yearly rains. Here conditions are suitable
for agriculture, and here before the British imperialists' occupation,
agricultural communities like the Kikuyu practiced their system of
shifting cultivation, and this area became the heart of revolt and resent¬
ment in Kenya.
4. The central plain zone and Rift-Valley regions have tropical
climate and water-courses are numerous. It consists of deep, fertile soil
and was cultivated by a great agricultural tribe, the Kavirondo, or known
today as Luo.
In analyzing these zones we find that the third and fourth zones
have always contained the great bulk of the territory's population.
The Memorable Dates of Historical
Significance in Kenya
In analyzing the dates of historical and political significance in
Kenya the first were the Arabs in search of slaves and ivory. In Mombasa,
they provided and spread tales of the wild ferosity of the Masai. This
succeeded in keeping others (British, Portuguese, and Spanish slave
stealers) from the secrets of the interior of today's Kenya (or East Africa
as it was called).
1. 1848-Johann Rubman, a German missionary, was the first white man
to sight Mount Kilimanjaro.
2. l849*Ludwig Krapf, another German missionary, was the first to
see the snow of Mount Kenya (formerly known by Kikuyu as "Kirinyaga."
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While these two Christian men dreamed of a chain of mission stations
stretching across Africa from Mombasa, the coastal tribes proved unprore*
Ising.
3* l883*The first Englishman, Joseph Thomson, penetrated the
Interior through Masai country and visited the Kenya highlands In so-
called 'prospecting a new route to Uganda.'
4. l885«B1shop Hannington, taking the same route through Masai
country met his death on the borders of Buganda, but Kabaka Mwanga (King
of Buganda) could not long continue to keep the Europeans from using this
route.
5. 1888-In order to hold the East African territory, the Imperial
government preferred to work through a chartered agent: the Imperial
British East Africa Company was formed In 1888—Its base was at Mombasa.
6. 1894-S1r Gerald Portal, British agent In his arrival to Uganda
raised Union Jack at Kampala and a protectorate over Uganda was complete.
On the East of Uganda outside the area of caravan passage tribal Afri¬
cans remained untouched.
7. 1895-It was after June 18, 1895 when proclamation of a protec¬
torate In coast of Kenya (Mombasa Strip) that following the British pro¬
tectorate the administration was slowly extended.
8. 1896-The Arab rebellion against British In coast of Kenya was
suppressed by regiment of Indians brought from India—The Arab rebellion
was known as "The Mazrul."
9. 1896-The focus of attention shifted from coast to hinterland.
10. 1896-The beginning of construction of rallway-and since the
Africans were unaccustomed to wage-labour It was considered by British to
4
Import Aslans from the state of Punjab in India.
11. 1901«The completion of railway from coast of Kenya to Lake
Victoria (Nyanza).
12. 1902-The imperialists encourage so-called white settlement.
They asked that "the natives should be made 'more amenable to European
supervision' and described Asiatic immigration as 'detrimental to the
European settlers* in particular and to the native inhabitants gener¬
ally'."' This was the beginning of racial struggle in Kenya politics.
13* 1902-The taxation was imposed on Africans and more land alien¬
ated so that Africans could work for the white man.
14. 1903-Then the colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, offered
the establishment of Jewish state in Kenya. He referred to Jews as "the
distressed Jews of Eastern Europe, then suffering linder Russian pogroms."^
15. 1903-The small white population of Kenya encouraged more whites
to settle in Kenya especially their white cousins from South Africa
(Afrikaners), Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.
16. 1903-This year can be called in history of Kenya 'the official'
beginning of the so-called White Highlands. It was the beginning of land
alienation or land stealing.
17. 1905"0n April 1, 1905, what existed as British protectorate in
Kenya was transferred (because of political changes in England), together
with Uganda and so-called British Somaliland, from the Foreign Office to
the Colonial Office.
'George Bennett, Kenya, A Political History—The Colonial Period
(Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 7.
^Ibid.. p. 8.
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18. 1906-Secretary of the state in Colonial Office in England granted
then 600 settlers the authority to form a government, and provided them
with a new constitution: the commissioner became Governor with executive
and legislative councils. Yet, the interior of Kenya was neither a colony
nor a protectorate, but ruled by military forces.
19* 1906-A Masters and Servants Ordinance was proclaimed in Kenya
based on the law of Transavaal (South Africa), allowing both payment in
kind and imprisonment of labourers for breach of contract.
20. 1907-An accident took place in March, 1907 which shook the
country and drew such wide attention when Captain Grogan, one of the so-
called civilizing pioneer settlers, took the leading part in the public
flogging of three Kikuyu servants in front of the Nairobi Court Houses.
21. 1907*’When the first legislative council met-then the governor.
Sir James Hayes Sadies (1905-1909) announced a Land Board to be appointed
with five unofficial members (settlers). This Board was known as the
Stewart's Land Committee (named under former commissioner Sir Donald
Stewart, 1904-1905). The Committee called for the "reservation of the
Highlands for white settlement."*' Also, they urged the establishment of
"native reserves" 'few in number but of large extent and far removed
from European centres-something which might have meant wholesale removals,
particularly of Kikuyu who were occupying the highlands they wanted.
22. 1907-The Land Committee discussed earlier, suggested the appoint¬
ment of a Secretary of Native Affairs (white settlers) to deal, in his
department, with the labour supply.
3lbid.. p. 23
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23. 1908-The governor was forced by white settlers to advocate a
law allowing the whipping and pass Laws to discipline the natives, besides
taxation to force out labour.
24. 1909-Early in March, Lenana, the chief laibon of the Masai died.
He was opposed to removal of Masai from Laikipia. But when he died, the
Governor Girouard cabled the colonial office that the Masai leader had
expressed a 'dying injunction' that the move from Laikipia should take
to reunite already separated tribes. At first Legalishu, the chief of the
northern Masai group was forced to sign an agreement in April, 1909 and the
Masai were evicted.
25. 1911<*'rhe crucial year when colonialists meant business: that
'they are there to stay'. In the Legislative Council (white controlled)
they recommended and obtained 999 years leases-instead of 99 as the Colonial
Office wanted, although they did accept revisions of the rents of land for
every thirty years.
What about Africans? The same imperialists approved of the clause
in the Bill that the native lands should be called 'Crown Lands' and was
to be a source of political trouble in the future.
26. 1911*The Native Registration Ordinance was passed which meant
the compulsory registration of all adult native (Africans) males in order
to facilitate the movement of labour-and which became a constant source
of complaint among Africans.
27. 1912-The settlers began to pay direct taxation (poll tax). In
order for the Africans to work for the white man, they were forced to
pay hut taxes and poll taxes.
28. 1913-The district officers were required to encourage Africans,
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by force, to go to work and personal registration was imposed under this
system. African men were obliged to carry passes recording their finger¬
prints, records of tax payments and details of employment.
29. 1914-World War I broke out and most activities were curtailed.
30. 1915>'rhe Crown Land Ordinance was finally passed in May, 1915*
It defined 'races' as meaning 'persons of European, Asiatic, or African
origin as the case may be'. This Ordinance provided for leases of town
lots for 99 years, for leases of agricultural land for 999 years, meaning,
of course, that the whites were there to stay.
From 1915 to 1919 wartime prevailed and everything was almost at a
standstill.
31* 1920-The Kikuyu chiefs formed a Kikuyu Association to represent
their grievances.
32. 1920-Kenya came to be known as a colony and protectorate.
33* 1921-The Young Kikuyu Association was founded by Mr. Harry
Thuku.
34. 1922-Harry Thuku was arrested and then deported for eight years
and the movement was banned-scores of people were killed.
35* 1923-The Kikuyu Association re-emerged in the form of the Kikuyu
Central Association.
36. 1927*A controversy arose between the KCA and the Church of
Scotland Mission over female circumcision.
37. 1940-The KCA was banned because of agitation; while World War II
was in progress.
38. 1944-Eluid Mathu formed the Kenya Africa Study Union. Mathu
was the first African appointed representative in the Legislative Council.
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39* 1946-Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya.
40. 1947*When James Gichuru stepped down as president of the Kenya
African Study Union ("study" had been dropped from the name) In favour of
Kenyatta, the movement became Kenya African Union KAU).
41. 1948-The Hau Mau name was heard.
42. 1952-(a) Kenyatta was arrested, (b) a state of emergency was
declared, (c) the KAU was banned, and (d) Nau Hau murders were reported.
43. 1953**The trade union, Kenya Federation of Labour, served under
Its Secretary Tom Hboya as a substitute for political organization.
44. 1955"Government allowed Africans to form political organizations
at the district level with the exclusion of all Kikuyu. Two parties
emerged: Nairobi District African Congress and Nairobi People's Conven¬
tion Party.
45. 1957-For the first time In Kenya history, eight Africans were
elected to the Legislative Council.
46. 1958-The African representation was Increased to equal that of
the Europeans. The tempo of African politics Increased markedly.
47. 1959-Afrlean-elected members boycotted the legislative council
for a new constitutional conference.
48. 1960-Constltutlonal Conference was held In London, where British
conceded an African majority and Kenya at last became certain that It
would follow the pattern of the other East African sister countries.
49. 1960-The State of Emergency was lifted, and two nationwide poli¬
tical parties were formed (KANU and KAOU).
50. 1961-Kenyatta was released, another constitutional conference
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was held in England^ and KANU-KADU coalition government was formed.
51. 1963-In June KANU formed the independent government and on
December 12, 1963 Kenya became an independent nation.
52. 1964-Kenya declared itself a republic.
CHAPTER II
KENYAN SOCIETY BEFORE THE WHITE PRESENCE IN KENYA
The African society before white presence In Kenya was rooted through
what we may call the "tribal system". The various sides of African life*
before the coming of white colonizers, were parts of an Integrated cu1«
ture.
The key to this culture was and still Is the tribal system, and the
bases of the tribal system are the family group, age-grades, and clans,
which among the African and especially the Kikuyu shape the character
and determine the outlook of every man, woman, and child In the society.
The Kikuyu outlook was essentially social; there were certain mutual
claims which were generally assumed. Relatives helped and consulted each
other In matters of common concern. Anyone who was In need would go to
his nearest prosperous kinsman as a matter of course. The mutual claims
and helping each other were taken as a matter of good breeding and custom,
rather than of legal enactment. It was these collectivities which held
Kikuyu society together. The British Imperialists had destroyed the total
fabric of the old tribal system through which African Instincts, thoughts,
and emotions found express and had failed to replace It by a satisfying
substitute.
The white presence In Kenya disturbed the great sacred Kikuyu tribal
Institutions and disrupted and disregarded all African social Institutions.
Before the destruction of Kikuyu custom and cultural Institutions the
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coloniaHsts needed a base and the base was the land. When the imperial¬
ists first came into Kikuyuland, the Kikuyu looked upon them as wanderers
(oruri) who had deserted their homes and were lonely and in need of friends.
The Kikuyu welcomed the wanderers and felt pity for them. They were allowed
to pitch their tents and to have a temporary right of occupation in the
belief that one day they would get tired of loneliness and wandering and
finally return to their own country.
These early imperialists played on sincere hospitable nature accorded
them by the Kikuyu people. They agreed to the terms of a muhoi (one who
acquires cultivation rights on the lands on a friendly basis without any
payment for the use of the land), and soon started to build small forts,
saying that "the object of the stations (forts) was to form a centre for
the purchase of food for caravans proceeding to Uganda, . . . For Kikuyu
was reported a country «fhere food was extraordinarily abundant and cheap.
Trusting their guests the Kikuyu unfortunately did not realize that these
places (forts) were used for preliminary preparations for taking away
their land.
The stealing of the Kikuyu lands was followed by degradation of
traditional African customs and culture. In the Kikuyu country sheep and
goats were regarded, before the introduction of the European monetary sys¬
tem, as standard currency of the Kikuyu people. The system of exchange
of goats and sheep was abolished by the introduction of what we know now
as currency.
These domestic animals did play an important role in the economic,
religious, and social life of the Kikuyu people. This role included the
following functions:
'lord Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire (2 vols., Edin¬
burgh, W. Blackwood, 1893)» P» 323*
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1. A man who possessed a number of sheep and goats felt no less
than a white man with a large bank balance.
2. Sheep and goats were a necessity for religious purposes or
sacrifices and purifications.
3. Meat for feeding people and skin for clothing them.
4. Without sheep and goats a man could not marry. In marriage
they were used for ''marriage insurance" (dowry).
Traditionally the Kikuyu were freely trading with their neighbors,
the Kamba and Masai, for example. The advent of the white man restricted
these trading centres by imposing heavy license fees through the estab¬
lished white government.
Among the Kamba tribe, who are nearest to the Kikuyu in their culture
and who had a common border, free movement was prohibited except for those
with special passes issued to them by the government.
Other disturbances were created when colonialists imposed through
their government machinery and missionaries the notion that what was Afri¬
can was bad and that consequently Africans must imitate the white man's
culture based on Christianity.
The Church of Scotland Mission issued an order demanding that all
Kikuyu followers of that church wishing for their children to attend their
schools should pledge themselves to never practice woman circumcision.
Children of those who did not denounce the custom were barred from attending
missionary schools. This custom of initiation is looked upon as a deciding
factor in giving a boy or girl the status of manhood or womanhood in the
Kikuyu community.
All native dances were denounced as "primitive" and no substitute was
given. For even dancing western dances or holding a dance, one had to
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have a license.
The Christians abolished the Kikuyu custom of polygamy, which the
Kikuyu customary law of marriage provided that a man may have as many
wives as he could support. The economic important and social prestige of
having a large family was a factor which encouraged polygamy.
Before the advent of the white man, the institution of serfdom and
wage«workers was unknown to the Kikuyu people. Tribal customary law recog¬
nized the freedom and independence of every member of the tribe. At the
same time all were bound up together socially, politically, economically
and religiously in a system of collective activities and mutual help; so,
the coming of whites curtailed all these practices by imposing laws and
ordinances geared toward individualism consistent with the capitalist
theory of "each to his own".
The way the white presence disturbed Kenyan society was to destroy
the most sacred rights people enjoyed before the coming of the colonial¬
ists. It is beyond human comprehension to see how a people in any society
can reach a so-called "higher level" of civilization while they are denied
the most elementary human rights (they used to have) of self-expression,
freedom of speech, the right to form social organizations in order to
improve their own country. To ask why the Africans revolted (Hau Mau)
is to ask why the African was reduced to a state of serfdom: his initia¬
tive in social, economic, and political structure was denied; his spirit
of manhood was destroyed; and, he was subjected to the most inferior posi¬
tion in human society. If the oppressed dared to express his opinion on
any point, other than what was dictated to him, he was shouted at and
blacklisted as an "agitator." The tribal democratic institutions which
were the boast of the country (people) were suppressed. Oppressive laws
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and ordinances, which alone engross the monopoly of thought, of will, and
of judgment, were imposed on the African people. These are conditions
that white presence created and led to what came to be known as "Mau Mau."
The destruction of African customs was not only carried out by set¬
tlers and the administration, but more also by so-called civilizing
missionaries. This is analyzed and well-stated by Mr. Oginga Odinga:
. . .But over the years it dawned on me that I had listened
to many preachers and they seemed, all of them, to preach one
thing in common—the suppression of African customs. They
were not satisfied to concentrate on the word of the Bible;
they tried to use the word of the white God to judge African
traditions. An African was condemned as heathen (primitive)
and anti-Christian. Those who lived among and mixed easily with
the non-Christians who were, after all, the majority, were them¬
selves dubbed heathen. Tribesmen who kept many animals were
condemned as anti-Christian because the possession of many
animals meant it was possible for a man to marry and pay dowry
for several wives. Any roan married to more than one woman was
anti-Christian. Villagers who lived in the traditional fenced-
in clusters of huts were anti-Christian.^
The Battle of Some African Tribes In
Opposition to White Intrusion
The seeds of violence were planted in Kenya when the imperialists
tried to enslave Africans in their natural land. There viere numerous resis¬
tances by many African peoples to the intrusion of British imperialist
power. The resistance was an expression that whether the Africans were
politically united or not, the African resistance to intrusion by the
British imperialists became the birth of African nationalism in Kenya and
that was an expression that the colonialists were not welcome.
The resistance intensified as British agents of the Imperial British
East Africa Company (IBEAC) and later the Foreign Office sought to con-
^Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (New York: Hill and Wang, 1969),
p. 42.
15
soHdate their influence beyond the immediate neighborhood by building a
handful of forts which spread across the country.
The first resistance by African people was an attempt to preserve
their integrity. The nature of the European penetration had, if I may
say, significant consequences for the later development of African nation*
alism in Kenya.
The facts remain that African opposition to colonialization was
widespread; there were few sections of the country that did not experience
some violent confrontation with European-led expeditions against natives.
Many of the most severe encounters took place in the early years of this
century. They fell within the memories of some participants in the later
era of the militant Mau Nau nationalists. These events had a powerful
effect; they marked a distinct turning point in the lives of individuals
and in the history or memories of tribes throughout Kenya.
In due respect, the nature and the consequences of early African-
European contact depended to a great extent on the internal rather than
external organization and strength of the African tribes themselves. How¬
ever, the established power positions of the various people relative to
each other strongly affected their response to the colonialist incursion.
In the final analysis, let us view the vigorous resistance of pastoralist
tribes which proved to be formidable in fighting during the intrusion.
The Somali resisted imperialist occupation of their area and they
also resisted the British control of the border between them and Ethiopia,
so the British had to establish posts which were maintained by military
(King's African Rifles) until 1942.
The Kalenjin group proved among the most difficult for the imperialists
to deal with because they regarded their grazing land sacred.
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The Nandi tribe was one of the most famous groups which had a mili¬
tary reputation between 1895 and 1905, for the British had to send five
military expeditions to deal with them. Their resistance lasted until
1905, when the Nandi Field Force, the largest (besides Nau Mau) "punitive
expedition" ever assembled in Kenya, was mounted against them. Although
the Nandi generally accepted the decision to be confined to a "reserve",
the temptation to plunder the white man remained. In 1907 the government
still found it necessary to deport some of the Nandi leaders.
The expeditions were also sent against the Kipsigis. Following a
series of clashes over the cattle and land with the Boer settlers in an
area known as the Uasin Gishu Plateau, an expedition was dispatched against
Elgeyo and Marakwet in 1902 and 1905. Also, another expedition was sent
in 1919 against Elgeyo while in 1923 there were reports of grave unrest
among the Nandi.
The more settled and much larger agricultural groups also refused to
submit passively to the alien authority, but their mobilization against
intruders was more difficult than that of the pastoralists.
The Karoba, who had once controlled the main routes from the coast to
the highlands had shown sporadic and uncoordinated opposition to the Bri¬
tish for more than twenty years.
In 1896 a punitive expedition was mounted against the Kager clan led
by Gero and about 200 were killed (with guns).
In 1899 C. W. Hobley, best imperialist soldier, led an expedition
against Sakwa, Seme, and Uyoma Location, Nyanza province, in which "2,500
2cattle and some 10,000 sheep and goats were captured."
2
M. G. Whissom, "The Rise of Asembo and the Curse of Kakia," Proceed¬
ings of the Conference of the East African Institute of Social Research.
19o1, p. 9.
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From 1907 to I908 large military expeditions were sent out against
Kitosh on the slopes of Ht. Elgon.
In 1905» according to a British police officer who was there, several
hundred Gusii warriors were killed by machine guns in a "massacre."^
In 1908 a "King's Rifles column entered Kisii, burning huts, des¬
troying standing crops, and capturing all livestock within their reach.
Over 100 Gusii were killed and 5»643 cattle and 3>28l sheep and goats were
seized.
There was fierce contact between the Taita and imperialists against
British demand for porters.
In 1914 the Giriaroa waged fierce fights with the British when they
tried to open 100,000 acres of land for European plantations. The Giriama
bound themselves together by oath to live or die there. Another fight
occurred with the same people when the British tried to conscript 1,000
porters for military purposes during World War I.
Deportation of Kikuyu leaders had taken place before the Mau Mau,
therefore, it was not a new thing to the Kikuyu people. In I89O the
established fort Dagoretti in southern Kikuyu was in the process of being
completed. It was at this time that the Kikuyu turned against the fort
which was under the command of George Wilson. They began a virtual siege
of this post which terminated in its destruction. In the following year,
1891, Captain Eric Smith established, as the Kikuyu story goes, a new post
at Fort Smith, a few miles away from Dagoretti. It is also said that "with-
^Robert Foran, A Cuckoo in Kenya (London, 1936), pp. 177-78.
^Robert Foran, The Kenya Police. 1886-1960 (London, 1962), p. 29.
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in a few months the local (Kikuyu) leader, Waiyaki, who might have consoli«
dated an alliance as mutually advantageous as that of Humia in Nyanza, was
deported to the coast. On the morning after the return of a major punitive
expedition against the 'Vfaguruguru" section of the Kikuyu, Waiyaki had
visited Fort Smith, possibly to remonstrate against the action."^ 'Vfhile
there he (Waiyaki) alledgedly tried to assassinate a company official, one
Purkiss, in his room."^ Waiyaki died not on his own hand as Rosberg tells
it, but he was buried alive at Kibwezi. It is true that Waiyaki became
the first Kikuyu martyr in the hands of the imperialists. The Waiyaki
incident is still one of the most discussed and became one of the turning
points in Kikuyu nationalist mythology. Even the deportation of other
Kikuyu leaders such as Harry Thuku in the 1920's and Jomo Kenyatta in 1952
had no such impact to Kikuyu nationalist movement as that of Waiyaki.
There were many more "punitive" expeditions against the Kikuyu with
British administrators. They penetrated the area of Kiambu, Fort Hall
(Muranga), Nyeri, Embu, and Meru. In the final analysis this was a "paci¬
fication" of the Kikuyu country. Hall, the administrator decided to carry
out his plan of "pacification" by punishing the area.
"We soon (with his soldiers) set to work, lit up a kraal
and got the men warm again. . . we made a mess of all their
villages and, as the other column was working along about two
miles off, the natives had a warm time, but they wouldn’t stand,
so I had no choice of trying my war rockets. The Major (Smith) *
with his one arm carried a short gun and bagged a brace in the




first kraal but I had no fun for a long time ... We brought
in 1,100 goats and loads of grain ... but we didn't manage to
do much execution as the brutes wouldn't stand."7
Hall's account of a later pacification of anima1*1ike episode in southern
Fort Hall (Muranga) district in 1899 will illustrate bis animal-like or
blood-thirsty white fascists who stated that . . .
"As usual the natives have deserted their villages and bolted
with all their livestock. However, we scoured the forest and
collected a good deal and then proceeded to march quietly
through the country, sending columns out to burn the villages
and collect goats and other animals. We rarely saw any of the
people; when we did, they were at very long ranges, so we did
not have much fun, but we destroyed a tremendous number of
villages and, after fourteen days, emerged on the plains to the
eastward, having gone straight from one end to the other of the
disaffected districts. We captured altogether some 10,000
goats and a few cattle, and this on top of the previous expedi¬
tion, roust have been a pretty severe blow to th«n."®
If Mau Hau was worse than this wanton massacre of African people by
white fascists during colonialization, then the language of mass killings
speaks for itself when we note that . . . "Five years later, farther north.
Col. R. Meinertzhagen notes that in ten days in February and March of 1904
his column, one of three in the Irianini (Nyeri-Embu border country, all
Kikuyu) expedition, killed 796 Kikuyu and captured 782 cattle and 2,150
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sheep and goats." The early confrontation between Kikuyu and British
imperialists had no symbolic moment of surrender to the new authority.
But the Kikuyu were counting on time and when that time came, it was the






The advent of British imperialists was not until the nineteenth cen>
tury. The coast of East Africa had held interest for alien powers. The
Persians established towns there—outposts of their then great empire.
The Portuguese held uneasy sway there from the fifteenth to the eighteenth
centuries. The Arabs finally established themselves in dominions under
the rule of the sultans of Zanzibar, and, until the latter part of the
nineteenth century, controlled the coast and a prosperous African slave
trade. These developments had more effect on tribes living in the shores
of these areas, but had less effect on the tribes of the interior, whose
region was separated from the coast by a wide desert and forest belt.
Until about i860 the European powers had little interest in the pros¬
pect of colonies in Africa. Back in 1827, the British Foreign Office had
with little reluctance relinquished control of Hambasa, today the Kenya
sea port, which had been declared a British Protectorate. Yet less than
sixty years later Britain colonialists were avidly seeking the control,
not only of Nambasa, but of all East Africa and much more besides. The
explanation of this altered attitude lay in the changes taking place in
European and American capitalism. By i860, Britain's imperialism role
as the 'Sforkshop of the world" became seriously menaced. In the face of
so-called rising competition from France and, later, Germany, the old
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slogan of "free trade," and the picture of colonies as 'Sni11 stones round
our neck" were fast being displaced.
The key features of the age was the trend towards monopoly strengthened
by the competition from abroad. This was most evident in the iron and
steel industry and in textiles, but became more true of the new industries.
Intimately associated and related with the new concerns were the banks,
themselves rapidly becoming monopolized in a few hands and which gave capi*
talists and imperialists a strong hand. It is true to say that the fusion
of industrial and banking capital was the motive power of the new imperi¬
alism. To ask why the whites went in foreign land as uninvited guests is
to answer that the new sources of supply of raw materials were urgently
needed to feed the mighty industrial machine that concentration of capital
had made possible. As capitalism in France and in Germany had after I880
much the same needs as Britain, a feverish struggle was begun between the
great powers for exclusive supplies of raw materials and exclusive rights
of capital investment. So Kenya became a British colony because Britain
was first in the field, and possessed a powerful fleet, came off best in
the struggle for colonies. By 1900 the division of the world and Africa
in particular was completed and Kenya was caught up in that struggle.
Explanation of Why Whites in Kenya
The explanation of Britain's reasons for coming and occupying East
Africa and Kenya in particular were threefold.
The first reason was strategic—the safeguarding of the route to
India which had materialized with the opening of the Suez Canal, and the
protection of the back door to Egypt. India had become a treasure for
British investors and millions of pounds were being drawn out of the
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country by these imperialist investors. Furthermore, Egypt was the key to
the most important waterway (Indian Ocean) in the world. Her cotton plan*
tations were important to feed machines in England. So in the safeguarding
of these two great prizes was of the utmost importance.
The second reason was the desire to forestall any other powers which
might exploit any wealth the area might have. As Lenin says:
Finance capital is not only interested in the already known
sources of raw materials; it is also interested in potential
sources of raw materials because present-day technical develop¬
ment is extremely rapid—Hence the inevitable striving of finance
capital to extend its economic territory and even its territory
in general. In the same way that the trusts capitalize their
property by estimating it at two or three times its value,
taking into account its 'potential' (not present) returns, and
the further results of monopoly, so finance capital strives to
seize the largest possible amount of land of all kinds and in any
place it can, and by any means, counting on the possibilities of
finding raw materials there, and fearing to be left behind in the
insensate struqgle for the last available scraps of undivided
territory. .
The third reason, the one we were taught and given most prominence
in the school history books, the abolition of the slave trade, as if
British capitalism were not engaged in slavery. These were entirely sub¬
sidiary to the first two reasons.
The abolition of slavery served more as a pretext for seizing terri¬
tory than as primary objective, as most western Christians came to believe,
while the system of forced labour later introduced in Kenya by the Bri¬
tish imperialists administration was not much preferable to slavery.
The way in which that part of East Africa which is now Kenya became
a British colony and followed the classic African pattern—the use of
armed force, as indicated in Chapter II, the use of missionaries as pawns
'v. I. Lenin, Imperialism.
national Publishers, New York),
The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Inter-
p. 83.
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in the imperialist game* the encouragement of commercial enterprise in
the form of a chartered company (Imperial British East African Company),
and the final assumption of full power by the state.
In the "opening up" of a prospective colony the French and especially
the British enlisted the support of missionaries whose work of civilizing
could be at once "protected" by armed force should the indigenous people
object to conversion by attacking the missionaries.
The Theory of Land Stealing
The theory of land stealing in Kenya was the European colonialization
of the highlands of Kenya in the early years of the present century. Later
that colonialization had an important impact on Kenyans, especially the
Kikuyu. Broadly speaking European settlement and land stealing was
largely a consequence of the construction of the Uganda railway. The
railway solved the communication problem with the coast of Kenya and
opened the way for colonization of the wealthy and fertile highlands. For
the railway to pay its cost of construction, the European settlement was
encouraged by the Foreign Office because this seemed to be the only way
in which the railway could be made to pay.
In Kenya, we find that European settlement of the highlands began in
or along the borders of the Kikuyu country, at first along both sides of
the railways between Nairobi and Limuru and later spreading northwards along
the Nairobi-Thika Road. Other reasons why the land was stolen was that
when the early European explorers passed through the southern Kikuyu
country, they found it densely occupied. But the Kikuyu land was not
stolen until they were subdued by a series of para-military operations
which spread from Kiambu to Nyeri and overcame the Kikuyu resistance.
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virtually ridge by ridge^ by burning their huts, looting their crops and
rounding up their cattle. By the time the early settlers arrived in the
Kikuyu country, the Kikuyus had already been subdued; they could no longer
resist the alienation of their land.
The government in cahoot with settlers pursued a policy of securing
the highlands area for European settlement by delimiting from time to
time, in the form of native reserves, the areas to which African were
restricted. It is needless to add that these African reserve areas never
included ancestral lands of Africans on which the sacred graves of our
ancestors remain. There was a justifiable feeling of insecurity among
the Africans regarding their land rights even in the reserves, because the
reserved areas had never been gazetted; there had been no clear expres-
sion by the government as to the exact limits of intended European occu>
pation, and there were, in fact, numerous cases of alienation of land to
Europeans even from the proclaimed African reserve areas.
The land problem became so acute that the Kikuyu came to have a
sense of value of organization and public exposure of their injustices.
For example, the Kikuyu Central Association in 1932, presented a well
organized and printed petition to the so called "Kenya Land Commission."
The petition or memorandum represented to the commission Board read as
follows:
In placing the view of the Kikuyu people before the commission,
we wish to commence by stating the difficulties and handicaps
under which we suffer in making this representation.
We are a primitive race (Africans) having come in contact with
what is called 'civilization' for not more than half a century
and yet we are confronted with the task of having to prepare
a case in a manner which should be worthy, the consideration of
a body composed entirely of gentlemen whose methods of thinking,
experience based on books or limited years of government service
are entirely alien to the community on whom they are sitting in
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judgment. We have therefore to borrow means and methods and
ape the manner in which the case may appeal to you from your
point of view and according to your stands of measuring the
requirements of a people t«ho from the alien point of view are a
species of living being which was hardly known to them about
fifty years ago.
Our difficulties become aggravated when the fact Is taken Into
consideration that our association, which has taken upon Itself
the unpopular and unpleasant task of making an attempt to place
before the British people the case of Kikuyu, In Its nakedness
and true aspect, without any sophisticated frill. Its not only
gagged but crippled and tied by hands and feet, for we are not
only denied the freedom of speech and press, but we are also
forbidden from holding meetings and even collecting funds to
enable us to make our voice reach the ears of the civilized
world.
Our honest efforts for making the truth known to the outside
world and especially to the British people Is construed as sedi¬
tious and revolutionary while In reality we are rendering a real
service to the British people by acquainting them with the real
feelings of the people whose destinies they have taken upon
themselves to rule and control.^
In understanding the land stealing by Imperialists from proclaimed
African reserve the excerpts of late Senior Chief Kolnange Mbiyu speaks
for Itself:
I was born near Kyambaa; the Shamba (garden plot) was named
Njono, and It Is now occupied by Europeans. The first European
came to my country when I was a small boy herding cattle, at
which time the Kikuyu and Masai were frequently engaged In war.
This first white roan was a German named Count Teleki; who came to
the country hunting Ivory. The people were so surprised to see
this 'ghost child', white like a baby, that they slaughtered
sheep and smeared the blood over their eyes-they saw him white
and thought he had been born just as he was. When he smoked they
thought he had fire In his stomach. . . The German stayed at my
grandfather's (Gathecha's) village and a goat was taken and Its
blood drawn. There was a native with the German and they took
some of his blood, and some from one of Gathecha's sons, and
smeared each other with It, and a piece of the goat's skin was
put on the wrists of the native, and also on the Arab accompanying
German, as on Gathecha and one of his sons. This was to make peace.
As quoted In The Land Equation In Kenya Colony, Journal of Negro
History. XXIV (January, 1939), 37.
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The German gave gifts of wines, bracelets, brass and beads, and
he was given fat rams and taken part of the way to the Ruiru
River, where he was handed over to other people for safe conduct.
Many years ago there was an important chief of all the Kikuyu
known as Kinyanjui. He was named chief by the Smith>Mackenzie
Trading Company. But he was deceived by European promises.
The Europeans told Kinyanjui that the Kikuyu had suffered from
great famines and that it he would agree to let Europeans make
shambas (gardens) on the unoccupied lands, they would plant
vegetables and other crops and would help the people avoid another
famine. So chief Kinyanjui, without consulting his elders, gave
the lands to the whites. Some surveyors were sent in to survey
the lands given by Kinyanjui and the people looked with curiosity
on what they were doing and asked, 'What are these men doing and
what are these strange roads (lines) they are making?' But they
only said, 'Let them make their roads*the grass will grow over
these European paths, as no one will use them.'
Soon after Kinyanjui brought in several Europeans and Askaris
(word for soldiers or policemen) and said they would build houses.
The Europeans offered money to the owners of the lands for dis¬
turbance (the offer was made through Kinyanjui) but the owners
refused. However, Kinyanjui took and kept the money himself and
the Europeans stayed on the land. The people did nothing about
this as there was nothing they could do. Soon after this, at a
baraza (meeting) called by the District Commissioner, I was made
chief over my people in the Kiambu section, replacing my father,
Hbiu, who was getting old. The provincial commissioner was
present at this baraza, and though I was given no badge or paper
of authority, I was instructed that it was part of my duty to
help whitestrangers who would come to my country. At this time
there was only one European farmer in this district-at Riara-but
I was told that many more European farmers were coming, and that
I should help them to take care of their property and see that
they got labor.
Before I was made chief and while my father was still in authority
a house was built by a European on Ngaria's (my first wife's grand
father) land at Riara. Although the house was there, we never
realized that the land belonged to the Europeans, whom we thought
were tenants at our will. About the same time, there was another
house built by Europeans near Tigani (these were both thatch
houses). The Europeans were only cultivating small vegetable
gardens. Soon after this, the baraza was held at Riara at which
I was made chief. Then a meeting of chiefs was held at Nairobi
where we were told that there were too many chiefs and that many
of us would be removed, but that those retained would be paid by
the Government. I was told that since 1 was on European land 1
must be paid by the European farmers and not by the Government.
This was the first time I knew that the land belonged to Europeans
and not to me. After this many new European farmers came in —
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Soon we discovered that those early surveyors had surveyed all of
this land and it was being given to the whites without the natives
knowing what was happening. But the Government had never told
us that the land was no longer ours. Nothing was offered to Mbiu
or to me by the whites who settled on our lands. But in other
places we heard that barazas were called by the District Commissioners
and natives were offered compensation for their crops which had been
destroyed (but not land taken by Europeans moving onto the land,
starting cultivation and building houses). The District Com¬
missioner came to visit Mr. Barlow, a European farmer on the land,
part of which belonged to me and my relatives, and told Barlow
to force us to take compensation for our crops. We refused to
accept it. We were forced to work for the European farmers, and
if we refused to work we were forced off the land and our huts
were pulled down —
I was sorry to move from my ancestral lands, but we could do
nothing when the whites moved onto our lands, because we were
afraid of being killed by them. We didn't say a word, as some of
our people had already been killed by the vrhites. We also believed
that since we had refused compensation from the whites, the land
remained our own.3
The theory of the land stealing and the Kikuyu people's protest
made them to be disliked by the settlers because they were able to demon¬
strate in past years a remarkable ability at organizing protests against
steady European encroachments on our land and liberties.
In ending this paragraph on theory of land stealing by imperialists,
I must say that our grandfathers were not against the strangers. They
followed the Kikuyu custom and they were always willing to receive strangers
and help them as much as they could. But we have a Kikuyu proverb which
says: "The cunning man does not always like to keep company with another
cunning man. He prefers sometimes to keep company with a fool." As the
colonialists pretended then to be wise people and the African (Kikuyu)
were less wise, what followed was that when the Kikuyu had gotten educated
and wise sons, these sons turned the tide by considering what deceits and
^Ibid.. pp. 38-41.
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cheating their fathers had suffered from the whites, and this led to
mistrust of the whites. It was very difficult to convert Kikuyu hearts
when once they turned against anything or anyone and that's why nobody
could have stopped the Mau Mau uprising.
An Analysis of Coming of Missionaries in Kenya
One cannot discount both the positive good and unquestioned harm
accruing from the presence of a strong missionary movement in Kenya. One
wonders how they were able to get an initial foothold. There were two
primary reasons: in the first place, the missionaries were generally
approved of by the white entrepreneurs and farmers who saw in the mission¬
ary teaching, a westernizing Influence which would be of value in creating
a more effective labor force. On the other side of the coin, the tribal
chiefs regarded missionaries as intermediaries between natives and whites.
These factors, combined with an initial indulgence and curiosity on the
part of the chief, offered at least the basis for a start. Having been
given their chance, the missionaries set to work. They found most respon¬
sive those individuals who were delinquents from the social life of the
tribe. With the offer of free land, the missionaries had considerable
initial success. Missionary methods were of two sorts, that of itinerant
preaching, and that of missionary stations, the latter of which became the
more prevalent. It was felt that these stations would help disassociate
the natives from their tribal settings. Of the first converts, the
majority were men. Women shrank back partly out of fear of losing the
bride price, partly because of enjoyment of the polygamous marriage sys¬
tem which cut down on field work. With later social disruptions causing
a rise in prostitution which was unknown in Kikuyu people and female
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conversions became more common.
The later missionaries were to find considerably more difficulty.
With the diminution of cattle raiding and inter-tribal warfare, the church
began to lose its role as a peace maker. There was moreover, a general
reluctance to abandon the bride price (dowry) and polygamy. In addition
the so-called Christian marriage ceremony held no significance for the
Africans. Finally, the church precipitated disagreement on the division
of labor between the sexes. The women had done the bulk of the field work
and the strong objection voiced by the missionaries caused dissatisfaction
on the part of a great number of tribesmen who saw not only an interrup¬
tion in the social organization, but a great deal more labor for themselves.
Along with the development of African education and the Christian
ethic arose strong religious cults called dinis whose effect on the develop¬
ment of the Mau Mau was to be considerable. These dinis rose up in reac¬
tion to many of the negative aspects of Christian influence in Kenya.
Polygamy, female circumcision, and the bride price were all ruthlessly
dealt with by the missions, who, in their religious fervor had neglected
to observe that these were part of the warp and woof of the African social
fabric. Their determination to change prevailing conditions overrode
however their sympathies with existing customs they could not take time
to understand. They had failed to observe that the bride price (dowry)
system was something more than mere wife purchase. It was a system designed
to ensure tribal stability and an insurance against the possible ill treat¬
ment of a woman by her husband. If the wife were to leave the husband
without good reason, his family would get the bride price back. Were he
to mistreat his wife, however, there would be no bride price refund and
the wayward husband would lose both his property and his wife. It was
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felt moreover that although there was a considerable amount of Christian¬
ity preached, there was in actuality little evidence of its existence.
Drinking, swearing and gambling were pronounced as evil and immoral, yet
Africans could see the same thing being practiced by the whites. Canon
T. C. F. Bewes has said quite succinctly:
The Kikuyu of old hit upon a truth that is valid today. They
were right when they reckoned that religion is meant to effect
the whole of life: isn't this where we western Christians
have strayed ourselves and have so helped to mislead the Kikuyu?
We tend to keep our religion and our daily life in watertight
compartments.^
Compounded upon this was a lack of knowledge on the part of many of
the missionaries, of the language and customs of the people with whom
they were coming into contact all over the world. Conversion was placed
over education. Poor classroom facilities were the general rule. One
observer who could tell it like it was in his book has suggested that
religious snobbery lay at the roots of the entire missionary movement.
While it is no doubt true that the motives of the missionaries were the
best, some of the efficacy of this criticism is undeniable.
The truth remains that the sending out of missionaries is
a practice born of race contempt. We see in other lands
institutions which differ from ours, we assume that ours
are superior straightway we send our people to knock down
the native establishments and set up new ones modeled on our
own in their place. In other words we condemn and being
kindly at heart we seek to ameliorate the lot of all those
unfortunate creatures who are not as we are.^
The cumulative effect of these social sores was a rising tide of
native discontent fed by the inadequate feelings fostered by disrupted
sacred tribal beliefs, and discontent with missionary teaching. Biblical
Canon T. C. F. Bewes, "Kikuyu Religions-Old and New," African
Affairs. (April, 1953), 203-210.
5
Philip Ainsworth Meems, Racial Factors in Democracy (Boston: 1918),
p. 6.
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justification from the Old Testament was found for the retention of po1y«
gamy and female circumcision. These were not only aspects of African
discontent with missionary. The very nature of their work meant that
missionaries were automatically involved in the land stealing as well as
the problems of the country. The required land for mission stations and
industrial activities. They selected stations in the midst of populous
districts in the hope of gathering a harvest of souls and sometimes
engaged in highly commercialized farming to raise money for expansion.
The missionary occupation of the highlands coincided with that of the
settlers, white colonizers: missionaries took up land alongside settlers,
under the same land regulations and adopted the same methods of cultiva¬
tion. That is why we used to say (Gutiri mubia na muthunga) meaning that
there was no difference between settlers and missionaries. The feelings
of our stolen lands was a significant factor which gave popularity to the
Mau Nau war of liberation in trying to regain our land back from the
imperialists.
CHAPTER IV
PRE-EMERGENCY KENYA: "WHITE MAN'S COUNTRY"
When former Prime Minister Harold MacMiIlian referred to the "Winds
of change" which swept the world, he was commenting primarily on the
changing nature of colonialism. Nowhere in the world today are the "winds
of change" as strong as they are in Africa; indeed in some cases they blow
with hurricane force. One such storm swept the British East Africa terri¬
tory in Kenya from 1952 to I960. The hurricane which struck Kenya was
Mau Mau, a revolutionary protest movement centered in the Kikuyu tribe
and aimed at the expulsion of all foreigners (especially imperialists)
from Kenya.
In analyzing some of the questions asked, a study of Mau Mau as a
social, political, and military force should be helpful in increasing
both knowledge about Kenya specifically and about the phenomena of politi¬
cal violence and irregular warfare in general.
In order to show the cardinal features of the background from which
Mau Mau developed, the outlined history of Kenya from 1895 to 1963 speaks
for itself.^
In 1895» the British government took over official responsibility for
Vor the history of Kenya, see such works as Elspeth Huxley, White
Man's Country (London: Macmillan, 193^)» 2 vols; Majorie Ruth Oil ley,
British Policy in Kenya (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937); William
McGregor Ross, Kenya Fr^ Within: A Short Political History (London: G.




the area now known as Kenya from the Imperial British East Africa Company.
A railway was built from Mombasa to the Lake Victoria (Nyanza) at the
end of the 19th century, and in order to make it economical, white settle¬
ments in the highlands area stretching northwest from Nairobi (capital
city) was encouraged. Various land laws attempted to ensure that native
(Africans) land rights would not be unduly infringed upon but, in the
alienation of some of the Kikuyu land near Kiambu (my hometown, north
of Nairobi), the basis was laid for the *Mand question” which plagues
Kenya up to this day.
A Kenya Legislative Council was set up in 1906 and in 1919 European
elected mennbers sat on the Council for the first time. Asians first
entered Kenya as railway workers and traders and soon grew in numbers and
influence and formed the trading (which they still hold today) and pro¬
fessional middle classes next to the whites. In 1923 their political
demands were met by providing for five elected Asian members on the Legis¬
lative Council. However, the Asians were dissatisfied with this arrange¬
ment and did not begin to cooperate fully under it until 1934. African
interests in the Legislative Council were represented by Europeans appointed
by the Governor until 1944. It was at the end of that year that the first
African representative to the Legislative Council was appointed, Hon. E. W.
Muthu. By 1952, the Legislative Council had evolved to a number of 54.
Of these 54, 28 were unofficial (i.e. intended to present settlers' rather
than governmental interests) fourteen Europeans (elected), six Africans
(appointed by government), six Asians (elected), and two Arabs (elected).
In 1932 there was a commission (the Carter Land Commission) which
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sought to settle the Kikuyu land question, but in spite of its exhaustive
investigations and the settlement it offered the Kikuyu very little as
land was concerned and the problem remained unresolved. Meanwhile, the
Kikuyu because of their "stolen land" had become one of the most politically
articulate tribes in Kenya. The Young Kikuyu Association, founded in 1920,
evolved into the Kikuyu Central Association by the mid 1920's. The main
objective or core value of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) was to
regain the "stolen" lands. In the late 1920's the Church of Scotland
Mission came out strongly against the Kikuyu custom of female circumcision
and this gave KCA another lively issue. The religious and social contro«
versy over the female circumcision issue led to the founding of the Inde¬
pendent Kikuyu Church and schools which were later to be a significant
factor in the growth of Mau Mau revolutionary movement. Mzee Jomo Kenyatta,
later to become the leading African politician in Kenya, was KCA secretary
(leaders) during this period. In 1940 KCA was banned (as former YKA) by the
white government with guise of subversive activity in connection with
World War II.
Four years later the first appointed African representative in the
Legislative Council, Eliud W. Mathu, founded the Kenya African Study
Union in 1944. At the end of the war this group evolved into a political
party, the word Study, was dropped in 1946 to become Kenya African Union
(KAU), on his return from Europe in 1946, Jomo Kenyatta became (KAU)
President.
The Meaning and Interpretation of Mau Mau
In analyzing the general meaning of Mau Mau this is what the white
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imperialists have written:
The alms of the Mau Hau was to enlist the entire Kikuyu
people for the task of ejecting, or destroying, the white
settlers, crushing mission Influence and Christianity
generally, and overthrowing the government.2
Mau Mau Is a Kikuyu word, meaning you want to do something
very much and very quickly. . . Many Kikuyu I have asked
assert that Mau Mau are simply words, having no particular
meaning ... I am Inclined to think that Mau Mau has some
particular meaning connected with the early religion and
traditions of the tribe.^
Mau Mau Is a disease which has been planted from outside
and It has to be recognized as such. Those who have planted
It have made full use of the savage Instincts of the African,
of his superstitions and his gullibility. . . Mau Mau . . .
has both Indian and Russian support.^
Mau Mau Is a secret society whose aim Is an African tyranny
In Kenya (with Kikuyu predominance), deriving Its power from
the exploitation of tribal feeling and superstition. It
encourages race hatred and Is violently anti-European and
antl-chrlstlan In character. It pursues Its alms by forcible
administration of secret oaths to men, women and children, _
and the Intimidation of witnesses and law-abiding Africans. . . •
Furthermore **The significance of the Mau Mau rebellion cannot be
overlooked. It Is not simply a Kenyan problem. It concerns
the whole of Africa south of Sahara. It may even be the concern
of the whole world, but merely In terms of financial losses due
In anarchy, should It spread, but In terms of world strategy.
There are those who think the white man should withdraw from
Africa, but even they can hardly be prepared to hand over the
continent to Moscow adding a further vast reservoir of man power
to her armies and bases to her planes and ships. . .
These are the official figures of casualties to date (April, 1956,
still the war was going on) resulting of the Mau Mau Insurgence:
^Collin Willis, Who Killed Kenya (New York: Roy Publishers, 1953),
p. 76.
3c. T. Stoneham, Mau Mau (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1953), P* 23.





1*773 loyal Africans (excluding the Kikuyu Guard) were killed—
this is probably a gross understatement as it only includes those
whose bodies have been found; 522 of the African Troops (including
the Kikuyu Guard) were killed; 27 Asiatic civilians and 3 in the
security forces were killed, 63 Europeans in the Security Forces
were killed and 98 wounded; 32 European civilians and 26 Asiatic
civilians were killed; and 10,399 Hau Mau were killed and 2,436
taken prisoners, 1,014 of these were wounded.
At present the number of Africans detained in emergency detention
camps has reached a total of 42,976. Since October/ 1952 to end
of March 1956 (41 months) the lost to the government has amounted
to 39,534,132.7
It is estimated that 2,356 Africans were killed by Hau Mau, 524
in the Security Forces, 1,832 civilians, and 95 Europeans, 63 in
the Security Forces, 32 civilians.®
The former governor of Kenya has something better to say about Hau
Hau although being an imperialist himself.
Analyze that question as you will, the inescapable truth, as I
see it, is that Mau Mau took hold of Kikuyuland because under
our present system of administration the central authorities in
Kenya had for years been getting more remote from the realities
of Kikuyu life and sentiment. The rise and ultimate virulence
of Hau Mau were, to put it plainly, due to a faulty system of
government. We shall never, in my belief, be rid of it if we
refuse to face that mortifying fact.°
Mau Mau was a secret, revolutionist group composed mainly of Kikuyu
(and the closely related Embu, Heru and few Kamba tribes). Its offshoot
appears to have begun in 1947 or 1948 and grown rapidly until it was con*
sidered so dangerous by the government that on October 20, 1952 an official
State of Emergency was proclaimed and special security measures were put
into effect.
Many things about Hau Mau are uncertain and mysterious due to the lack
^Ibid.. pp. 30-31.
®Susan B. Wood, Kenya: The Tension of Progress (London: New York:
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 33»
^S. and K, Aaronovitch, Crisis in Kenya (London: Lawrence and
Wishort, 1947), p. 141.
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of direct documentary evidence. Mau Mau had committed little in writing
and what there might have been remains secure in police files. An example
of the mystery surrounding Mau Mau movement is the name of the organiza¬
tion itself, as a Kikuyu Mau Hau has no meaning in Kikuyu language.
The origin of Mau Mau provides an example of the frequently posed
paradox "Does the time make the man, or does the man make time"? "Does
history make the man or does man make history"? In the case of Mau Mau
the questions when put in these forms in final analysis, "time does
make the man" and it is also true that "history does make man." Through
times and historical conditions, dominations directed by alien rules were
causes in which Kenya social unrest flourished and created Mau Mau as an
answer to oppression. Dr. J. C. Carothers, in his study. The Psychology
of Mau Mau sums up the situation like thiss
It (Mau Mau) arose from the development of an anxious con-
flictual situation in which people who, from contact with
an alien culture, had lost the supportive and constraining
influence of their own culture, yet had not lost their modes
of thinking. It arose from the exploitation of this situation
by relatively sophisticated egotists.
The problem of the reaction of the African society to the European
impact was of great importance to an understanding of Mau Mau. Broadly
speaking, the traditional tribal structure in Africa resulted in a society
in which major social change was a slow process; it did provide a framework
within which an individual, by surrendering himself to the demands of the
group, could find personal, spiritual and emotional security. Dr. Carothers
emphasizes the importance of belief in the group to the individual:
C, Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau (London: HMSO, 1954),
p. 15.
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Life in Africa was highly Insecure but the Individual did
achieve some Inner sense of personal security by adherence
to, and only by adherence to, the traditional rules—rules
which reserved their sanction and most of their force from
the •’will" of ancestors. .
It Is true to state that African societies came In contact with Europeans
who possessed a materially advanced culture the African's culture was
shaken to their roots.
It has become only too clear that when European Influence
Impinges on the Africans, his %«ho1e cultural machinery Is
apt to collapse quite quickly. ... It Is most clear that
the types of culture that one sees In agricultural communities
In Kenya collapse quite easily.
The point to be made Is that the weakening and disintegration of the
traditional society by Impact of Imperialists left an individual without
any point of social reference. As Mzee Jomo Kenyatta In his book. Facing
Mount Kenya, sums the situation like this:
The European should realize that there Is something to
learn from the African and a great deal about him to under*
stand, and that the burden could be made easier If a policy
of "give and take" could be adopted. . . the African who
Is being civilized looks upon this "civilization" with great
fear mingled with suspicion. Above all, he finds that socially
and religiously he has been torn away from his family and
tribal organization.13
Contact with the new culture and a widespread weakening of traditional
forms and beliefs left the Individual unable to find support from tribe
and family as he had before the advent of white men. However, lacking a
complete understanding of the new ways and facing the devil bewildering
colour bar, he (African) was 111 equipped to find a secure niche within
the new system. To achieve some stability In this tension producing
^^Ibld.. pp. 2-3.
^^Ibld.. p. 6.
13 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (New York: Random House), p. 120.
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situation, the African in transition from traditional to the modern world
seek out "a group with which they can identify.For this reason, the
African in transition is drawn to membership in political associations,
or in the case of Kenya secret movement which led to the Mau Mau Movement.
In general, it can be said that the forces of social conflict which
affect Africans in general are found in an even more intense form among
the Kikuyu. Carothers, starting from the specific Kikuyu case and working
toward the more general situation comes to the following conclusion:
In general, it would seem that all the elements of the vicious
circle observed in Kikuyu country also occur in all other
agricultural tribes of Kenya. They differ only in that the
process has not gone so far.l9
The major factors which made the problem of social change more pressing
in Kikuyuland were the greater pressures of the alien culture on the Kikuyu
due to geographic and historic accidents and the tribal structure of the
Kikuyu itself. Geographic and historic accidents resulted in the presence
of both Nairobi, the hub of Kenya, and of large areas of white settlements
in close proximity to the Kikuyu. Thus both their location and their organi>
zation made the Kikuyu more susceptible to the problem of social change.
^^his tendency is not unique to Africans in transition. Pye (Lucian
Pye, Guerrilla Coronunism in Malava. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1956, 343-46) in his study of Malayan communist SEP's (Surrendered
Enemy Personnel) concludes that the major reason these individuals joined
the Communist Party was their need for a group with which they could
identify and which could help them adjust to changing social conditions.
^^Carothers, op. cit.. p. 20.
l6For an examination of the special position of the Kikuyu see F. D.
Garfield, Origins and Growth of Mau Mau (Nairobi, Gov't Printer, I960),
7-30, 264; Carothers. op. cit». 8; and J. F. Lipscomb, White Africans
(London: Faber, 1955), p. 149.
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To enumerate further, the younger Kikuyu had lost their faith in
the old ways as missionaries taught them but could not quickly adopt to
meet new demands. They were not willing or able to follow outside (Euro¬
pean) leadership but Mau Mau provided a group in which they could find
meaning. In Mau Mau they developed strong incentives of their own for
the first time, and the old grievances became anew.
Although some Europeans sought to discount Mau Mau as a movement of
social protest and claimed it was exclusively “the work of thugs.It
was commonly recognized {when it was too late) that social problems
especially the key problems of land, urbanization of the African, over¬
crowded Reserves, low wages, the “colour bar" were mainly responsible
for the favorable response of the Kikuyu to Mau Mau.
The cry for the return of “stolen land" had been the rallying cry
of Kikuyu political organization since 1920.
The Kikuyu who wanted to advance his fortune found his way blocked
by lack of land.
“. . . the Kikuyu today who live in the native land units (reserves)
are not content merely to grow enough for subsistence. They want to
improve their conditions of living . . . but this is manifestly impossible
for the majority to achieve, since the present overcrowded state of the
land means that most people only have a very small acreage at their dis¬
posal
Although the land problem was the direct cause there was yet another
^^Carothers, op. cit.. p. 18.
S. B. Leakey, Mau Mau and The Kikuyu (London: Methuen, 1955),
p. 72
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social change which contributed to the rise of Mau Mau. This was the
partial urbanization of the Kikuyu. Throughout African urbanization
has led to problems of broken families, poor urban living conditions,
alienation of the African urban population from both the old and new
cultures and the rise of criminal activity. Kenya was no exception to
this general pattern and Nairobi as the capital presented the Kikuyu
with all the opportunities and pitfalls of urban living.
The urban population was more politically aware due to their greater
contact with current events as well as outside world and the fact that
they had more immediately felt grievances than did their relatives in
the reserves. The discontented, semi^urbanized Kikuyu population of
Nairobi, mostly commuters, provided Mau Mau with much of its original
impetus and later with most of its supplies, many of its recruits, and
most of its leadership.
The influence of urbanization in breaking family ties helps explain
the unusual role played by Kikuyu women in Mau Mau. In our traditional
Kikuyu tribal customs, we excluded women from oath taking but during the
Mau Mau women were encouraged for the success of the movement to parti>
cipate. This development was highly successful because Mau Mau drew a
great deal of support from the Kikuyu women.
Another major social problem from which Mau Mau drew strength was
the "colour bar." By creating a wall »<hich no African could penetrate
the colour bar left the Africans, especially those who had moved fur¬
thest toward the new culture (Europeanized), in a state of confusion and
despair. To many Africans it must have seemed that the colour bar could
only be escaped by desperate measures and that measures were nothing more
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or less than Mau Mau.
To understand some of the soul-eroding finality of colour
bar, it must be realized that, in a tribal society, each
member passed automatically from childhood to full adult¬
hood through a series of initiation ceremonies, which ensured
that added status was accompanied by added responsibility.
It was no joke to be faced with a lifetime of suspended ani¬
mation between the two societies.
Corfield takes the position that the "sense of social injustice"
arising out of the colour bar "is the main motive force behind the upsurge
of the more violent expression of precocious African nationalism."^®
In order to understand an important causal and restraining element
of Hau Mau, the religious factor roust be considered. The religious
aspect of the Africans' traditional culture had been one of the major
supporting and sustaining forces in our society. The coming of western
civilization almost completely undermined these traditional beliefs with¬
out replacing them with anything meaningful. "For some of them, Chris¬
tianity or Islam has taken its (the traditional religion's) place; but
for most, nothing valuable has been done."^^ To sum up further, Mr. Delf
in his book states that:
. . . this rather pathetic spiritual retreat catered to the
many who had left their own customs but had been unable to
find a home within one of the many expressions of Christianity
which were offered them. In the days leading up to Mau Mau
this retreat became a rout.^^
19
George Delf, Jomo Kenvatta; Towards Truth About "The Light of
Kenya" (London: V, Gollanz, 1961), p. 46.
^®Corfield, op. cit.. p. 26.
2.1
Carothers, op. cit.. p. 26.
^^Delf, op. cit.. p. 71
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One of the major channels through which Mau Mau spread was the
independent Kikuyu churches and Africans attending independent schools
which once I attended. The truth is that the teaching in the independent
schools was calculated to intensify feelings on the land question and
other Kikuyu grievances and setting the framework of mind for Mau Mau
revolution.
That we, the Kikuyu had grievances aplenty is clear and that our major
tribal protest movement which arose was anti>European is not too surprising
when two factors are taken into account. First, the Europeans' impact on
us were, in fact, the main cause of many of the Kikuyu's troubles; and
second, the psychology of the Africans favored such a development.
Needless to say, it is likely that a group such as Mau Mau could,
as a matter of speculation, have sprung full-blown from the earth as a
"spontaneous" protest movement. Some individual or group of individuals
needed to set the spark; to recruit the first members; to introduce the
new type of oath of unity, and so on. In seeking to trace the leadership
of Mau Mau, the trail is exceedingly dim and confusing since almost all
available writing or record on the subject is concerned with either con¬
demning or defending Mzee Jomo Kenyatta while the growth of the movement
is almost unknown.
It is sad when Mr. Carothers writes and tells us that:
The vicious circle is completed by the prestige that attached
to some knowledge of European ways. This could be used for
good, but has worked on the whole for evil. Many men have,
from alien sources, gained little more than a few new forms of
magic power. And these men have impinged upon the countryside
to exploit an anxious and conflictual situation for mainly
personal ends—political or often purely mercenary, and on
this basis Mau Mau has arisen.23
^^Carothers, op. cit., p. 56
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Sighting another example, we find that it was not exploitation by
the leaders to the people in countryside because:
As late as the end of September, 1952, there was still
no evidence in the hands of the Government that Kenyatta
was the organizer of Hau Hau, despite the fact that for
at least three years the Kenya police had been watchino
his every move with the aid of hundreds of informers.
But whoever started the movement it quickly drifted toward a more
and more extreme position which shook up the British imperialists. "The
more sophisticated agitators were replaced by those *fho called for the
rejection of all western ways."^^
I might agree with Mr. Delf's writing that, "even more than (Mzee)
Kenyatta, Mau Hau was the inexorable product of a seriously distorted
social system. . Thus while the first spark of Hau Hau had to be
set by an individual or a group of individuals acting consciously, the
social situation was so ripe for such a revolutionary oxivement that the
initial spark set a far larger and more self-sustaining blaze than could
have been expected even by the initiators.
An Analysis of Early History of Hau Hau
The early history of Hau Hau Movement is almost completely unknown
due to a lack of records. The organization first came to public notice
in late 1948 and early 1949. The name, Mau Hau has no apparent meaning in
Kikuyu or any other African language. Politically Mau Mau Movement went
2^De1f, op. cit.. p. 172
25ian Henderson, The Hunt for Kimathi (London: H. Hamilton, 1958),
p. 16.
^^Delf, op. cit.. p. 189.
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through two stages in its initial development. In its early stage it was
a secret political-religious movement under the control of educated leaders
intended as a weapon in the war of nerves against the government and the
settlers. It blended gradually into a second stage which had the support
either active or passive of the majority of the Kikuyu. The Kikuyus had
lost faith and lacked loyalty to the white man's government. This develop¬
ment was explained by Carothers in these terms:
Loyalty for a regime, as a feeling in oneself and not merely
as a pattern of behavior, can only be felt when that regime is
seen as representing something in oneself, as embodying in some
fashion one's own interests. But it seems that the Kikuyu
people do not see the British Government in that light; they
see it as something alien that wants to keep them subject.2/
Of course, Mau Mau also gathered strength because of its ability to
intimidate the hesitant and "Uncle Toms." The consequences of opposing
Mau Mau was death.
One of the most distinctive features of Mau Mau was the various
oaths of unity administered to the members. The solemn oath had always
been an important part of Kikuyu tradition for generations. The Mau Mau
oaths were semi-traditional and partly for unification of its members.
Oath was given at night, secret, and administered to all men as well as
women for revolution could not succeed without mass support.
So unusual was the role of the oaths that some writers were led to make
rash statements about oaths effects. 'The (the oathtaker's) minds and
their natures have been utterly changed and they have ceased to be normal
28
human beings.This nonsense is due to the fact that the white man
never dreamed that he would wake up one morning and see a new Kenya-
27
Carothers, op. cit.. p. 19.
^Lipscomb, op. cit.. p. 142.
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people ready to liberate themselves. The actual results of the oath
varied, there were oaths of fighting men and of the people In support of
revolutionary movement. The oath had a powerful effect on the mind of
the Kikuyu because It brought them together, ready to die; they believed
that they had a common enemy and this belief led them to actions never
dreamed of before.
The goal and major aim of Mau Nau was to drive the Europeans out of
Kenya by terror which really worked and was felt not only In Kenya or
Africa but In the whole world. Although some appeals were addressed to
other tribes In Kenya, Hau Mau was mainly a Kikuyu nationalist movement.
One peripheral point In connection with Nau Hau should be mentioned
and that Is the relationship of Mau Mau to Communism. Although Stone-
ham,In his book Mau Mau. Implies a link between Mau Mau and Communism
Corfleld,^^, Delf,^^ and Blunden32 conclude that there was no connection
between the two movements whatever. As I was Involved, the latter Inter¬
pretation Is more realistic.
As Mau Mau spread and became known, efforts were made by the author1
ties to break It up. Following the government crackdown on Mau Mau acti¬
vities, It became Increasingly necessary to use force In order to make
people take the oath and to enforce secrecy. The result was an ever
Increasing spiral of violence, especially toward African Christians who
29stoneham, op. cit.. pp. 27-28.
^^Corfleld, op. cit.. p. 220.
^^Delf, op. cit.. p. 68.
^^Blundell, op. cit.. p. 107.
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were refusing to take the oath and they became number one enemy of the
people. This lead to, at the end of 1952, the ''Declaration of a State of
Emergency" and to the "military" phase of Hau Mau.
Hau Mau on Campaign of Terror
The first use of violence was primarily directed against loyal Kikuyu
who had been "invited" to take the oath of unity and hesitated in accepting
the honor thus bestowed upon them.
It should be noted immediately that while the pressure and fears
engendered by the Mau Mau terror affected the entire colony, only a small
part of the total area of Kenya felt the direct impact of Mau Mau attack.
The section most intimately involved was a roughly triangular area balancing
with one tip on Nairobi and stretching one arm northwest to Thomson's Falls
and northeast to Meru on the slopes of Mount Kenya. Each side of this
upside down triangle was roughly 100 miles long and the base running east¬
ward between Thomson's Falls and Meru was about 85 miles long. The geo¬
graphy and demography of this area was molded by the military struggle
which ensued. In analyzing the guerrilla campaign in Greece, Edward
Wainhouse makes the following statement: "Terrain is of critical impor¬
tance in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Craggy, mountainous terrain
with crude roads and poor communications is ideally suited for guerrilla
operations."^^
According to this formula, a large part of the "Mau Mau area" was
well suited for guerrilla activity. The northeast apex was occupied by
Mount Kenya (17,058 ft.) and the broken jumble of foothills surrounding
it. The Aberdares Mountains lay all along the western edge of the Mau
33
Edward Wainhouse, Guerrilla Warfare in Greece. 1946-49. Mi 1itary
Review. XXXVII (June, 1957), 17.
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hills south from Thomson's Falls to northwest of Nairobi. The Aberdares
provided the main refuge for the Mau Mau forest fighters and Charles
Stoneharo's description of the area shows us why:
It is country in which a stranger becomes lost within a mile-
where an army might lie hidden within shouting distance of
its enemies. The towering forests of cedar, ra'sharage and
podocarpus are cut by deep brush-choked ravines. There are
escarpements a goat could not climb and rivers which sweep
through impossible gorges. . .
The central and eastern sectors of the triangle comprise the bulk of
the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Reserves. Most of this territory is cross-cut
by a network of small ravines and ridges, dotted patches of woods, Kikuyu
farm plots, and small villages. This relatively broken country combined
with a poor road network provided an additional terrain advantage for
guerrilla operation.
Nairobi ultimately proved to be the key to the entire Mau Mau Move¬
ment. The Kikuyu, Embu and Meru (the KEM tribes) comprised the largest
single tribal bloc in Nairobi. The KEM had generally become more educated
than the other tribes and for this reason held more significant jobs and
had higher incomes. Most of these groups while working in the city, kept
their land and their families in the Reserves. This situation of one foot
in the city and one foot in the country left them in a particularly confused
and vulnerable position. Mau Mau became well established among the KEM in
Nairobi and the city provided the supply and manpower depot which fed sup¬
plies and recruits northward into the Reserves and to the forest.
The area of white settlement were also affected by the Mau Mau freedom
fighters but were generally less favorable for guerrilla activity due to
the more regular lay of the land, the somewhat better roads, and the pres-
34
Stoneham, op. cit.. p. 69.
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ence of hostile white settlers and members of other tribes.
In describing the actual operations of Mau Mau a chronological his¬
tory is impossible since Mau Mau activities had such an irregular develop¬
ment and uncertain pattern. An analysis of the major types of Mau Mau
operations seems to be the best means of forcing Mau Mau actions into
some sort of coherent framework. In describing the operation of the forest
gangs, the gangs in Reserves, the Nairobi organizations, such chronological
elements as do appear will show the rise and fall of Mau Mau.
As a purely military weapon, the Mau Mau terror campaign can be seen
as a resounding failure.
Evidence of the blind compulsive nature of Mau Mau can be
seen in the pathetic military records of the terrorists. In
four years of bitter fighting only 32 European civilians were
killed, and 63 members of the Security Forces. By contrast,
11,503 Mau Mau were killed, and hundreds were hanged (by
government). Nearly 2,000 Africans were killed by Mau Mau,
not one train was derailed in all this time, and ambushes were
few and usually badly organized.
With the arrest of Kenyatta and other leaders, the movement had
little coordination—guerri1 la fighters were fighting in different areas
because of lack of coordinated control.
The Mau Mau were sworn to drive the white invaders from Kenya and yet
the magnitude of their direct effort against the whites was small, as
this comparison from Ian Henderson's book. Hunt for Kimathi shows: "Dur¬
ing the emergency more Europeans were killed in traffic accidents within
the city limits of Nairobi than were murdered by terrorists in the whole
of Kenya.
^^Delf, op. cit.. p. 189.
36•^ Henderson, op. cit.. p. 17
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Mau Mau Movement
The forest freedom fighters drew members from two main sources—
first, in the period of confusion and disorganization immediately follow¬
ing the declaration of the emergency and Kenyatta's arrest, many Mau Mau,
especially the more activist members took to the forest at once to avoid
arrest; and second, throughout the course of the emergency Mau Mau adher¬
ents who found it too hot for them in Nairobi or the Reserves, or who wanted
to strike a more direct blow for "freedom" formed a relatively steady
trickle of reinforcements for the forest revolutionaries. In the absence
of overall plans or orders from above, the Mau Mau had an instinctive
answer for their enemies and they knew when to strike.
The forest fighters were supposed to be the main striking forces of
Mau Mau and were given the resounding title of "Land Freedom Armies.'.'
The fact remains that whatever a westerner may think, the vast majority
of the Kikuyu seemed to have understood the movement. And they had felt
the need for something of the sort to such an extent, that the government
operation against Mau Mau became in fact an operation against the Kikuyu
tribe. The basic reason for Mau Mau defeat was due to the fact that pro¬
government Kikuyu loyalists and the Kikuyu Home Guard were a significant
factor in defeating Mau Mau by revealing the Mau Mau secret and day to
day movement. While for Africans, in the context of their cultural back¬
ground and especially in view of their level of military awareness, the
Mau Mau military effort was not quite as successful when compared to
guerrilla activities in the non-western world since World War II, its
political impact was nearly as great as that of the revolutionary wars in
Malaya, Indochina, and Algeria and certainly more significant than the
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communist guerrilla campaign in Greece in bringing about change.
It is not the military factor in itself which is decisive but the
military factor related to the other equally important facts of political,
social, and economic background. Therefore, the military aspect of Hau
Mau must always be viewed in the context of such circumstances as the
social breakdown of the Kikuyu tribe, the complex, tri>cornered political
relations between the settlers, the Kenya government, and British govern¬
ment (as represented by the Colonial Office); and the problem of "world
opinion."
Mau Mau Offensive
The Mau Mau had evolved the perfect method of guerrilla warfare, for
after all one of the key aspects of such war is surprise attack. However,
the elements of the objective is also important in guerrilla warfare.
One of the major factors in prolonging the Mau Mau campaign was the
existence of widespread passive support for the fighters among the Kikuyu
tribesmen all over the colony. The necessity for popular support is a
constantly emphasized factor in guerrilla warfare. Edward Downey comments
as follows The Military Reviewt
A guerrilla movement will be shortlived if the people do not
actively, or passively support its objectives. Inasmuch as the
guerrillas are not dependent on physical supply depots, they
live off the country and off the people. Unless their activi¬
ties have widespread popular support, they are doomed to defeat.
The Mau Mau had support among the Kikuyu in general, especially in
^^Edward F. Downey, "Theory of Guerrilla Warfare," The Mi 1itary
Review, XXXIX (May, 1959), 54.
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the passive form of not going out of the way to actively help the govern¬
ment discover and suppress Mau Mau activity. Hence, the name "passive
wing.'.' It should be noted that roost Mau Mau violence was directed at
Kikuyu who were either judged to be traitors or who would serve as an
"example" to their neighbors. The Mau Mau attack on these people and the
inability of the government to protect the individual African loyalists
help explain a good deal of Mau Mau support, or at least the lack of
government support. The Security Forces were first so heavily engaged in
the settled areas and in the forests that Mau Mau recruiting and terrorism
in the reserves could not be effectively checked.
Yet, it must not be assumed that Mau Mau gained loyalty by force only.
The social breakdown of the Kikuyu led many to support the movement as a
possible solution to their problem. Practical considerations other than
fear may also have been a motivating force for supporting Mau Mau, par¬
ticularly in the beginning of emergency.
". . . to the Kikuyu people it appeared that Mau Mau was winning all
along the line, and no Kikuyu wanted to be left out of a share of the
spoils if the Mau Mau did win."38
While the bulk of the Kikuyu might be considered as passive Mau Mau
supporters, by applying a criteria of "if you are not with me you are
against me" there was also a more formal "passive" organization in the
Reserves and in Nairobi which served as a supply and intelligence network
for the "active" forest fighters. The framework of organization, which
seems to have been largely theoretical, may be described as follows:
38J. F. Lipscomb, op. cit.. p. 142
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Mau Hau adherents below the top executive level were organized
Into councils* In theory each council was composed of nine
members. In each of the districts of Kikuyu Reserves—Nyerl,
Klambu and Fort Hall (Muranga)—^a district executive committee
was estab11shed.39
The most common relationship between the forest fighter and the pas¬
sive organization was a sudden nighttime visit by fighters' representa¬
tives to a sympathizer In the Reserves. Arrangements would be made re¬
garding required supplies and the passive wing members In the area would
undertake to collect them and deliver them to a pre-arranged point. That
these contacts were highly Informal for the fact that Psuedo-Ganos (former
Mau Mau fighters who had surrendered to the Imperialist government.
They equipped and used as real Mau Mau since they were Mau Mau fighters
themselves to capture their former friends alive. This technique proved
very effective In destroying the power and strength of Mau Mau) were able
to pass themselves off to passive wing members, who did not know them, as
legitimate gangs of fighters In need of supplies.
The entire supply system and passive wing "organization" were neces¬
sarily fluid since the fighters were constantly on the move and their needs
had to be met on the spot. Nevertheless, It was this flexibility which
gave the psuedo-gangs their opportunity to move In on unsuspecting passive
wing members and elicit from them Information on the real fighters recently
or operating In the area.
Passive support for Mau Hau was also shown through more "classical"
passive resistance movements. One example of this was the refusal of Kikuyu
farm workers In Rift Valley to be photographed for Identification documents.
39Baldw1n, op. cit.. p. 58.
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The crucial part of it is that in breaking the hold of Mau Mau in
the Reserves, another "traditional" element of guerrilla warfare was
illustrated, the use of local inhabitants for self-defense especially
those who corroborated with their imperialist masters. The Kikuyu Home
Guard plus the Tribal Police (and Meru and Embu units of the same type)
were of great discouragement in defeating the Freedom Fighters, especially
in the Reserves. Sure of this the Colonial Office Report on Kenya in
1954, gave this account:
... at the beginning of 1954 the Kikuyu Guard and Tribal
Police were accounting for 25% of all the casualties inflicted
on Mau Mau, at the end of the year that figure had risen to
50%; in addition many of the successes gained by the police
and the Army were as a result of information supplied by the
Guards.40
These Uncle Tom part-time soldiers and their usually primitive out¬
posts, in the heart of Reserves, sustained most of the Mau Mau fury
directed at the Security Forces and who were withdrawn after daytime
fighting to their barracks. Although these Guards suffered many losses
themselves, they were able to strike severe blows at the power of Mau Mau
because they knew the terrain and they were Kikuyu as were freedom fighters.
At the beginning of the emergency, Mau Mau fighters could move through
the Reserves with relative freedom, striking at European farms and Uncle
Toms loyal natives. By 1956, the activities of the Kikuyu Guard and the
Tribal Police operational techniques against Mau Mau greatly improved
intelligence activity police and the Army could not easily get effect of
this was dislocation of the triangular communications between the Reserves,
the forests and Nairobi. The defeat of freedom fighters by the imperialist
^^Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report on the Colony and Protec¬
torate of Kenya. HMS 1954, 115•
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government was also mainly due to the fact that there was no area com¬
pletely outside the area of operations but Nairobi which was a major source
of supplies, arms, and men that passed through the passive wing in the
Reserves to the forests. But when that was cut off by introduction of
Kikuyu Home Guard, Tribal Police and Operation Anvil in Nairobi, the free¬
dom fighters were forced to retreat for lack of outside help. Mau Mau's
strength among the African population of Nairobi also magnified its effect
because of the itnnediacy of events in Nairobi upon both Kenyan and world
opinion.
On April 24, 1954, Operation Anvil was begun in Nairobi. This opera¬
tion lasted until May 27, 1954. All KEM (Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru) tribes¬
men were detained and taken to a camp four miles outside Nairobi. They
were screened and marched before hooded informers (hooded to protect their
identity) who identified those whom they knew as Mau Mau supporters.
Although more than 35»000 KEM were screened and 5,914 were
arrested. Of these 5»914, one hundred and forty were released,
1,355 were declared to be redeemable and sent to special camps
and 4,411 were classified as hard-core Mau Mau and sent to
detention camps.
"Although it was not recognized at the time. Operation Anvil was the turn¬
ing point of the campaign by government against Mau Mau."^^
The Nairobi organization of Mau Mau and sources of supplies was
broken and it was never effectively reestablished in its proper supporting
role. The loss of the Nairobi base led to a steady deterioration of the
forest fighters. Henderson comments: '"Operation Anvil' destroyed much
Baldwin, op. cit.. pp. 30-40.
^^Tirees (London), 20 October, 1954, 7.
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of the central passive organization in Nairobi and broke up the best
supply pipe-line."^^
As the emergency wore on the technique of Pseudo Gang, (former free¬
dom fighters who had surrendered to the government) operations became
more and more significant to the government in destroying the forest
fighters. These Pseudo Gangs were captured and surrendered Mau Nau members
who preferred life in the forest to the detention camps were sent on for¬
est patrols equipped as real Mau Mau in fighting. This technique was
especially affective since fighters did not know each other and accepted
the Pseudo Gangs, their traitors, as legitimate. This allowed the Pseudo
Gangs to merge with real fighters and capture them alive, thus imperialist
government gaining useful intelligence and potential recruits for more
Pseudo Gangs. "Operations similar to Pseudo Gangs had been used against
the Huks (revolutionary movement) in the Philippines," and against
communists in Malaya.
The manner in which the Pseudo Gang operations under the supervision
of Police Superintendent Ian Henderson, (a prohibited immigrant now in
Kenya), captured Field Marshal Oedan Kimathi of Mau Mau freedom fighters,
was a good example of this technique. Due to the efforts of "Our Lost
Brothers" who became traitors, the Pseudo Gangs in the northern Aberdares,
it was possible to predict Mau Mau Fighters movement and most of them in
the area were known by name.
"It would be quite wrong to say that this admirable denouncement as
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the result of our efficient leadership. Far from it. The brains behind
the whole show were the converted Mau Mau themselves.'*^^
The Psuedo Gangs were the straw that broke the camel's back for the
Mau Mau "chain of command." So, in summarizing the military aspect of
Mau Mau, it can be stated that in spite of all its military disorganization
according to the "principles" of guerrilla war; lack of outside support,
hi
lack of secure base area, and lack of control, ' the overwhelming impor¬
tance of the social and political background in a conflict of this sort
must again be emphasized because the basic issue was not necessarily for
Mau Mau to win the war militarily but to change political and social
conditions. For General Sir George Erskine, British military commander
in Kenya then, made the following statement: "There is no military
answer to Mau Mau; it is purely a political problem of how Europeans,
Africans, and Asians can live in harmony."^®
^^Henderson, op. cit.. p. 169.
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fare," Military Review. XXXIX (January, I960), 53 and Hellmuth Kriedal,
"Agents and Propaganda in Partisan Warfare," Military Review. XXXIX
(November, 1959), 102.
48Delf, op. cit.. p. 190.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF MAU MAU ON KENYA'S
POLITICAL SCENE
Whether war is an extension of politics or politics an extension of
war, the continuing relationship between military action (or social
violence which is a liberation war) and politics is unquestionable.
While the violent fighting did not settle a complete victory, it had a
great influence on final outcome.
Starting on a theoretical plane, some political consequences of Mau
Mau were inevitable, since the underlying well springs of the terrorism
were political, social and economic, and it has frequently been pointed
out that irregular fighters so based cannot be defeated by military means
alone.
It may be hypothesized that although the Mau Mau did not achieve
specific "military" goals, the activity speeded up political development
in Kenya as a whole and certainly colored the entire political landscape
in new hues. There may well be a parallel here to the campaign of the
Malayan Communist Party, although Mau Mau had no connection at all with
communists, described as follows in the Military Review: "making use of
guerrilla action alone in the form of generalized terror, they (com¬
munists) were not able to obtain the decision, although their action
largely has tended a necessary political evolution."^
^Bashone, op. cit.. p. 60.
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This position of political evolution and social change was expressed
by Delf when he argued that "Kenya's political development doubled its
2
speed after Mau Mau. . . He went on to say:
Most Africans in Kenya knew very well that what Kenyatta
asked for in the years after the war (W.W. II) was due to
them as human beings. They did not believe that he was
responsible for the outrages of Mau Mau, but they knew that
after Mau Mau political development shot forward. If this
was a coincidence it was a very odd one."3
However, there may be more than a grain of truth in such comments.
Naturally, the white official government position was that "Mau Mau had
no such effect whatsoever and all political reforms were completely autono¬
mous of Mau Mau."^ Although it is theorizing of the broadest sort, it
seems truthful that, for example, constitutional progress would not have
been so fast if Mau Mau had not focused attention on the colony. Leaving
aside the question of whether constitutional progress would have been
more rapid under peaceful conditions, Mau Mau had a political impact in
terms of its effect on the general political atmosphere and more especially
in terms of strategic and tactical measures taken against Mau Mau which
may have long-run, unforeseen, but highly significant political repercus¬
sions.
Much of the politics in Kenya developed and centered on racial issues,
and Mau Mau was a racial movement. Therefore, the main frame of reference
in which the political impact of Mau Mau will be examined is the reaction
^Delf, op. cit.. p. 190.
^Ibid.. p. 260.
^Oden & Olivia Meeker, 'The Fuel That Feeds the Mau Mau Fires,"
The Reporter. (June 23, 1953)* 17-21.
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of the major racial bodies^ European, Aslan, and African, to the campaign
of threat.
The European settlers had early sought, as Imperialists elsewhere,
to protect their position by gaining as much political Independence as pos¬
sible. They feared that the British Colonial Office and Its official
government In Kenya would not give the (white) settlers' Interests proper
(that Is paramount) consideration. The settlers needed to get political
powers In their hands before an effective demand arose among the Africans
for African control. Early In the emergency the bulk of settler opinion
still seems to have held that It was not too late to capture power before
the African demands were too Insistent to be denied. Many of the fascist
settlers refused to recognize the Mau Mau as a force whose basic causes
were social and political. Rather, they viewed Mau Mau as a conspiracy of
terror to be met by terror: "For Kenya's Europeans only the total exter¬
mination of the gangs will suffice; few seem to realize that Mau Mau will
not die with the mere extinction of Its shock troops."^
The political view of most settlers In the early months of the emer¬
gency are well summed up In this statement on the floor of the Legislative
Council by European elected member Group-Captain, L. R. Briggs (then Mount
Kenya Representative):
. . . there Is no real Improvement In the situation. . .
the measures Introduced by the government up to now are not
being effective. . .one of the causes of this Is the apparent
need for reference of various matters to the Colonial Office. . .
the Labour Party at home are quite unscrupulously cashing in on
the suffering of all races in this country for party political
ends. . .1 believe that full powers to deal with this emergency
must be transferred to this country and I believe they must be
transferred at once.°
^Ibid.
Kenya, Legislative Council Debates. LIII (January 1953)» 28-30.
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When things became too hot to hold, the fascists white settlers
could only say that "the savagery of the Hau Mau was used of course to add
fuel to the flames of accusation against the African of irresponsibility,
lack of integrity and lack of constructive intelligence*"^
These white settlers were in an inherently weak position and they
probably realized it. The Kikuyu Freedom Fighters (Mau Mau) terror made
these white fascists feel even more insecure and more cut-off from both
Britain and the Africans. It made them feel, not unnaturally, victims of
a conspiracy, surrounded on all sides by enemies (Africans), but all we
needed was to have two or three more tribes on Mau Mau side and we would
have dished these crackers in one dish. The whites' reaction appear in the
speeches of the European elected members in the Legislative Council. Con¬
tempt for the Kikuyu is shown: "Kenya is becoming an object of contempt
from one end of Africa to the other. All the natives all over Africa are
beginning to think, if even the Kikuyu can get away with this sort of
p
bluff, what in the name of God could not we do?"”
But contempt for the British government in England is expressed also:
"It is a folly that I cannot even imagine being comnitted by any government
in the House of Commons—and there is practically no limit to what I could
Q
believe of that body."^
Mau Mau was viewed, not as a movement of protest, whether political,
^Lipscomb, op. cit.. p. 30.
g
Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, op. cit., p. 88,
^Ibid.. p. 96.
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economic, or racial, but as a conspiracy of a small group of malevolent,
self-seeking men: "this thought is not born of bitterness, it has been
instigated by evil men who have produced this bitterness by working on the
10
feelings of ignorant and stupid men, but it is not born of land hunger..."
At first, in the African view, it appeared that the lunatic settlers
might seek to take advantage of the pressures generated by the emergency
to gain political power by legitimate means. Suggestions such as that by
Group-Captain Briggs (quoted earlier) were echoed by more moderate leaders
such as Michael Blundell and at one point in early 1953 "a crowd of 1,500
Europeans demonstrated outside Government House in favor of sterner secur¬
ity measures and more house rules."^^
Naturally European demands of this sort were highly disturbing to
the Africans and Asians, who could well imagine their status in a settler-
ruled Kenya. The standing committee of the Kenya Indian Congress made
this statement in February 1953i "Such assertions, which have now become
very frequent, only serve to increase the suspicion that the European com¬
munity is trying to exploit the present situation for its own political
ends."^^
W. W. W. Awori, African appointed member of the Legislative Council
stated in Council debate that: "Definitely no sane person is going to
allow five and a quarter million Africans to be in the hands of 30,000
^Olbid.. p. 96.
^'Times, (London), January 13» 1953* P» 5*
'^Ibid.. February 11, 1953» 7
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Europeans in this country, until such time that the African can also par¬
ticipate in the running of this country."^^
However, as the Mau Mau crisis continued and intensified, and British
military and financial assistance became more and more necessary, "the
political leverage given the settlers by the emergency declined.This
led to a decrease in the pressure of organized groups for an immediate
transfer of power from the Colonial Office to Kenya (settlers). The begin¬
ning of a partial and gradual shift toward moderation can be seen in the
policy statement (largely inspired by the efforts of one European elected
member, Michael Blundell) of the European Elected Member's Organization
issued in November 1953* This statement called for: "(l) continued
British rule in Kenya; (2) multi-racial participation in the government;
(3) equal pay for equal work regardless of color; and (4) agricultural
reforms to make better use of the land."^^
At the end of the decade this moderate white element would appear
under Blundell's leadership as the New Kenya Group (all whites). However,
there remained a strong intransigent white element among the settlers
which showed itself by supporting racist candidates under the so called
Lyttleton Constitution Conference in 1956 and which later became organized
as the United Party (all white) under Group Captain Briggs. He was one
of the most racist whites in Kenya.
But the settlers, as time went by, reacted to the emergency in other
^^Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, op. cit.. p. 75.
1
Rawcliffe, op. cit.. p. 150.
'^Ibid., 152 and A. H. Rosenbloom, The Roots of Governmental Problems
in Kenya, unpublished M. A. Essay, Columbia, 1957.
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ways than through cohesive organized political significance than did the
overt political reactions. The extremely violent reaction of some Europ¬
eans to the Mau Nau undoubtedly served to create additional reservoirs of
racial hatred. Calls in the Legislative Council to "meet terrorism with
terror"^^ and statements like the following from the Kenya Weekly News
indicate the depth and nature of this feeling:
A few years ago the British would have hanged or shot about
a hundred Kikuyu for every European murdered and there would
have been an end to the trouble. It is suggested that a
strong military governor with no delicate feelings about being
sporting towards primitive savages should be given charge of
the Kenya situation and that the martial law demanded by the
settlers should be introduced.^7
Although the government refused to go along with a policy of "com¬
plete ruthlessness" many individual settlers and members of the security
forces did in fact adopt such a plan and they were killing Africans
(Kikuyu) at will. Reference has already been made to the tendency of the
security forces to shoot down helpless prisoners as a matter of policy.
This kind of attitude was not unique to the men in the field. It is also
seen in this statement of major-general Hinde, Director of Operation in
Kenya, made in a speech on 7t June 1954:
From the soldier's point of view it would be a good thing
to expel Kikuyu tribesmen from their reserves for the rest
of their lives. . . . What every soldier wanted was a kind
of swill tub. . . where 100,000 Kikuyu could be put out of
way on works projects and told that they were there for
life.'8
That such an attitude and disregard of human beings was put into
16,Humphray Slade as quoted in Rattfcliffe, op. cit.. p. 110.
^^Ibid.. p. 66.
18
Montagu Slater, The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta (London: Seeker and
Warburg, 1955), p. 246.
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effect is seen also in such cases as that of Captain G. S. L. Griffiths
(Durham Light Infantry) who was acquitted of a murder charge, but was
sentenced to five years imprisonment on charges which included "ordering
19
a soldier in his company to cut off the testicles of a prisoner."
Exactly why some of the settlers should have responded so violently
to the Mau Mau challenge is difficult to determine but in the final
analysis, three factors may have been influential. First, the inevitable
insecurity of a highly privileged class of 30,000 people living surrounded
by five and a half million underprivileged. Second, the shock of having
such a movement come from what was, on the surface, the most advanced and
most trusted tribe. In view of this Mau Mau seemed to be a stab in the
back. Third, the geographic relation of the Kikuyu to the centers of power
in the colony. The white highlands bordered on almost all sides of the
"Mau Mau area" and the dominant position of the Kikuyu in Nairobi meant
that the capital city, the key to the entire colony, was intimately effected
by Mau Mau. It can be suspected that if a Mau Mau>like movement had broken
out in some remote corner of the Northern province or even among a tribe
with less influence in Nairobi, there would have been far less fuss or
violence.
The Kikuyu Home Guard was another problem. The struggle between
them and Mau Mau particularly savage and the atrocities of the Guard were
laid at the door of the government by the Kikuyu caught in the middle.
Many of the home guards were real toughs, prepared to give
their service to the highest bidder; during the general
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breakdown of the machinery of justice and administration
these men ran a flourishing extortion racket.
However, as has already been Indicated above, the pressure of Mau Mau
led at least some of the settlers in the direction of greater moderation
and recognition of reality. In January 1956 the Nairobi Dally Chronicle
(an Asian paper) commented favorably on a speech by Michael Blundell in
these terms: "(This speech) recognizes that white domination Is Impossible.
21
Kenya must be put first and racial differences second."
And Kenya's Minister of Finance, Mr. E. A. Vasey, spoke as follows
to the Royal Empire Society In London:
Either we offer opportunities to the growing political
consciousness of the African or we will have to make con¬
cessions time after time, each seemingly dregged from us.
Increased participation by Africans In the political decisions
of the country was vital. . . .22
The Aslan In Kenya has generally maintained a moderate position
politically, and before the war in 1952, largely supported African nation¬
alism. The Kenya Indian Congress maintained an informal alliance with
the Kenya African Union before the Mau Mau outbreak. Although the immediate
Impact of Mau Mau was to frighten the Aslans badly and force them Into
close support of the government their reaction was not as extreme as that
of the European. This lack of extremism was evident In their willingness
to make political concessions and to moderate their own demands.
In analyzing the effect of Mau Mau on the African population some
basic differences must be recognized between the Impact on the KEM tribes
^^Rawcllffe, op. cit.. p. 69.
2^Da11y Chronicle (Nairobi), 17 January 1956, 2.
22 Ibid.. 4 February 1956, 1
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and that on the other Africans. However, in regard to at least one type
of impact these two broad groups were affected in the same manner. This
common element was a loss of confidence in and respect for the government.
Taking this factor into account it is rather remarkable that Mau Mau was
never defeated militarily. As a company commander in the Devonshire
Regiment remarked:
This war against Mau Mau won't be won up here in the forests
... It won't be over till we get the trust and confidence
of the people in the reserves.23
The security forces may have made it either impossible or excessively
uncomfortable for the average Kikuyu to support Mau Mau, but they did not
(at least until the very end) win his willing active support. The heri¬
tage of the anti-Mau Mau campaign is described by Rawcliffe:
The widespread and often brutal abuse of emergency powers
by settlers and security forces, the lack of supervision over
the African auxiliaries, the awful indifference displayed over
the death of loyalist (Uncle Toms) Kikuyu in the reserves while
the European settlers were being given every possible protection,
the violent and ruthless measures being openly advocated by the
settlers themselves, all added up to one thing, wholesale dis¬
trust amongst the Kikuyu concerning the intentions of the govern¬
ment and the Europeans.
When a protest as deeply rooted as Mau Mau is allowed to go as far
as it was in Kenya strong measures will inevitably be hard to suppress it
as was the case in Algeria, Cyprus and Vietnam. In such circumstances it
is unthinkable that the suppression can be accomplished in such a way that
further bitterness is not created. The measures taken in Kenya did not
generally deviate from this pattern. Although the measures of suppression
^^Saturdav Evening Post. 226 (May 1, 1953)» 112.
24
Rawcliffe, op. cit.. p. 107.
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in Kenya particularly tended to leave a legacy of fear and bitterness
among the Kikuyu, the frequent immediate actions and language of the
settlers and security forces could not help leaving seeds of suspicion
and fear among the other tribes as well. This increased fear and sus¬
picion among the races plus the fact that it was shown that the white man
could be challenged were among the most significant results of Mau Hau.
It should also be realized that these factors apply to racial groups
other than Africans, especially the Europeans. They saw their position
severely challenged and weakened for the first time and the savageness
of Mau Hau made them more fearful of the Africans as a group.
Orders issued under the Emergency Regulations prohibited any African
political organizations above the district level, and only non-Kikuyu
could join those which did exist. The result of this was to encourage
tribalism in Kenya politics and to dam up outlets for legitimate African
political demands. A pariiamentry delegation (from House of Commons)
which visited Kenya in early 1954 took the following position:
We believe. . . that it is necessary to provide an outlet
for African political thought. . • Africans should be
encouraged to develop their own political organization,
thus filling the vacuum created by the banning of KAU for
complicity in Mau Hau.^^
This cutting of the few channels of inter-racial communication which
did exist added yet another basis for misunderstanding and distrust.
However, this breakdown of political communication was never complete,
and other groups, such as the Kenya Federation of Labour (headed by Tom
^^Great Britain Parliament. House of Commons. Delegation to Kenya.
Report to the Secretary of the State of Colonies, (London: HMSO, 1954),
10.
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Mboya) and Nairobi African District Congress, headed by C, H. G. Argwings-
Kodhek), partly filled the gap. The district based political parties
became reasonably effective such as Nairobi African District Congress and
Nairobi Peoples Convention Party and as soon as the emergency was offi¬
cially ended in January I960, began to merge into larger groupings.
There was one way in which the emergency affected the KEM tribes
(especially the Kikuyu) and the rest of the Africans in diametrically
opposite ways. It has already been pointed out that the Kikuyu held a
highly advantage position as regards employment in Nairobi and the white
highlands. The emergency changed all that. In Nairobi alone 60,000 Kikuyu
lost their jobs and were replaced by members of other tribes (mostly LUO
from western Kenya). As the emergency came to an end and thousands were
released from detention and concentration camps, widespread unemployment
among the Kikuyu became evident. 'Thus unemployment is probably the big¬
gest single problem which confronts the Kikuyu today. . In circum¬
stances of rapid social change, such as existed in Kenya, unemployment on
this scale introduced a highly unstabilizing element, especially when those
without work could remember "the good old days" when they had the cream
of the jobs. Note also that in this case the element of conflict within
the African connunity exists since the Kikuyu may come to feel that the
LUO and others unfairly took advantage of their struggles.
The factor just discussed is not, however, a one-way phenomenon. The
Kikuyu and other tribes in Kenya have never gotten along very well for the
2^Susan Wood, Kenya The Tension of Progress (London: Oxford Univer¬
sity Press, i960), p. 34.
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Kikuyu ambition and the privileged position which the Kikuyu achieved In
the white man's world of education Intensified this antipathy. The fact
that Mau Mau was frankly a Kikuyu supremacist organization and did not
hesitate to slaughter members of other tribes who crossed Its path natur¬
ally served to aggravate the anti-Kikuyu feelings among the other tribes.
This aggravation was the main cause of one of the most significant poli¬
tical problems In Kenya following the end of the emergency: the conflict
between minority tribes^ the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and
majority tribes the Kenya African National Union (KANU) Is a case in point.
KADU (representing the smaller,,scattered tribes and whites) sought a loose
federal form of government In which the Kikuyu would not be able to domi¬
nate the other tribes. KANU (representing the Kikuyu In uneasy alliance
with some of the other large tribes) sought either a unitary state or a
federal government with strong central powers. Thus, a long-standing
tribal feud, exacerbated by the pressures of Mau Mau, formed the basis for
the main political conflict In Kenya as Independence approached. In fact
the conflicting constitutional view of KANU and KADU may have delayed
Independence for a year or more.
Following the release of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta In 1961 and Independence
In December 12, 1963, a single nationalist political organization was
finally formed under Mzee Kenyatta's auspices In November, 1964. African
leaders have sought to "rehabilitate" Mau Mau's memory and to consider
It as part of the Kenya nationalist struggle, as It was a nationalist
movement, while pursuing a reasonably moderate course In both domestic
and foreign spheres.
"VI1lagization" (kljljl or glchagi). Is the Improbable word used to
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describe what may well be In the long-run "the most significant social
result of Mau Mau campaign.Traditionally we lived in scattered home¬
steads on our own land rather than In villages. It was soon discovered
that the scattered homesteads could not be protected against Mau Hau
attacks and the security forces could not prevent aid from reaching Mau
Mau fighters through the homesteads. Therefore, plans were made to
organize large villages centered around a Home Guard Post. "At first
the project was violently opposed by most Kikuyu and threats had to be
28
used to force unwilling compliance."
Not only did v11lagizatlon prove very useful as a military tool for
denying Mau Mau targets and support, but soon most Kikuyu came to support
the system especially so called Christian families. The main reasons for
this support were the benefits In terms of better water supply, better
education, better health facilities, and social life after long time of
suffering during the critical period of Mau Mau fighting.
The consequences of v11lagizatlon should be great, for by providing
a new concrete social structure it strikes at the very root cause of Mau
Mau although long standing questions of land had not been solved.
Determining the Impact of Mau Mau on the formal constitutional pro¬
gress of Kenya between 1952 and I960 Is, as has been said, fraught with
dangers. Direct causal evidence Is almost totally lacking but a general
Impression can be drawn from the fact that before the emergency the European
^^For an excellent general survey of v11lagizatlon see L. S. B.
Leakey, "New Ways for the Kikuyu," Manchester Weekly Guardian, 20, Decem¬
ber 1956 and 27, December 1956.
^^Ibld.. 20, December 1956, 5.
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elected members in the Legislative Council took the position that they
had no intention of allowing African representatives in the Legislative
Council to out-number them for at least half a century. Yet the consti¬
tutional change introduced in I960 provided (some 42 years early appar¬
ently) for just such an arrangement of representation.
The first constitutional change of this period was the Lyttleton
Constitution of 1954. (Named after the then Secretary of State for Colon¬
ies, Oliver Lyttleton.) Under this constitution the six African members
would be elected rather than appointed and one of the elected African
representatives would also serve as Minister of Community Development on
a newly created Council of Ministers. This council of ministers would be
•'the principal instrument of government in the colony.The council
would be composed of the governor and deputy governor plus fourteen mem¬
bers, six of them from the unofficial side of the Legislative Council.
Of these six, three would be elected Europeans (minority group), two
elected Asians (also minority), and one elected African.
It was provided by the constitution of 1954 that if the elections
returned members who were willing to serve as Ministers the constitution
would remain in effect until I960. If the arrangement should become unwork¬
able the constitution would "revert to what it was before the emergency...."
that Africans forever were to be at the mercy of white elements but an
apparent recognition that Mau Mau had introduced new factors in the poli¬
tical equation and the British Government would be free to take whatever
*
29
Great Gritain, Colonial Office, Kenya. Proposals for a Reconstruc¬
tion of the Government (London: HMSO, March 195^), 2.
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action it desired. The African reaction to the Lyttleton Constitution
is aptly stated by George Delf:
But what might have been manna from heaven in 1951 was
now regarded as little less than an insult. The African
members elected by what the government naively hoped were
"moderate," immediately boycotted this constitution on
the grounds that they had never agreed to it.30
Even before the African election referred to by Delf (which took
place in March 1957) the Lyttleton settlement had to be modified in an
attempt to make it more palatable to all racial groups. In October 1956
the membership of the Legislative Council was enlarged by adding two more
elected African members (making a total of eight) and the Council of
Ministers was enlarged by adding one more European and one more African.
Both the Africans and settlers were unhappy with the Lyttleton Con¬
stitution. The Europeans also found it to be obnoxious, but for quite
different reasons. In the European and Asian election under the Lyttleton
Constitution (in October 1956) a majority of the Europeans voted for
settler supremacist rather than moderate candidates. The London Observer
commented as follows on this trend:
Last week's election. . .showed a majority of white settlers
opposed to the Lyttleton Constitution. . . This opinion shows
no awareness of the growing African scepticism of, and opposi¬
tion to multi-racial government. By their vote the settlers
have encouraged this trend.
The next step in Kenya's constitutional development took place in
1957. By the end of the year it was apparent that the refusal of the
African elected members to participate in the government under Lyttleton
^%elf, OP. cit.. 193»
^^As quoted in the Dai1y Chronicle (Nairobi), 10, October 1956, 1.
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Constitution had made that settlement unworkable. The European and Asian
unofficial members of the Council of Ministers resigned in order to clear
the way for Alan Lennox-Boyd, the new colonial secretary to find a differ¬
ent basis of agreement. When they were unable to achieve a compromise
among the conflicting opinions of the various groups (Africans, Asians,
whites), Lennox-Boyd imposed a settlement which was reluctantly accepted
by all.
The basic features of this plan were: “first, six additional African
representatives in the Legislative Council (which would give the African
equal representation with the Europeans); second, provision for twelve
additional representatives in the Legislative Council to be known as
specially elected members. Europeans, Asians, and Africans would each
get four of these seats. Nominations and elections of specially elected
members would be by the Legislative Council; third, it was promised that
any additional expansion of the Legislative Council would not be on a
communal basis. The Council of ministers remain as before but an appointed
council of state would be created to serve as check against discriminatory
legislation in the Legislative Council.
In January I960 the official state of emergency was declared at an
end as a political overture to the Kenya constitutional conference in
London. At this conference, which lasted from January 18 to February 21,
i960, political decisions which would have been unthinkable eight years
before these were taken. At the beginning of the conference the colonial
^^Report on the Kenya Constitutional Conference (London: HMSO,
February, I960), pp. 1-5.
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secretary Ian Macleod laid down the general policy Great Britain would
seek to follow: "(a) Kenya would eventually be independent of United
Kingdom control, provided that Africans, as well as other communities in
Kenya, took a share in the government of the country; (b) "independence
would not take place until the government was responsible to a legisla¬
tive fully reflecting the difference of views of all the people expressed
through the medium of a wide franchise; (c) "individuals of every com¬
munity should have full opportunity to participate in the administration
of their country in a spirit of mutual tolerance, though for a time the
interests of minorities might have to be secured through constitutional
safeguards.Except for protests from the European United Party, the
ultimate goals were tacitly accepted and the conference resolved itself
into a discussion of practical details.
The specifics of the plan finally settled on need not be detailed
but were, for the first time in history of Kenya, the most significant
factor was that Africans gained a majority in the Legislative Council and
equal membership with the European and Asian unofficials on the council
of ministers. Extensive consideration was also given to the question of
safeguards for the rights of racial minorities which led to present situ¬
ation of Europeans and Asians being in Kenya today. Thus in a period of
eight years internal and external pressure had changed Kenya from a colony
in which the settlers were demanding home rule for themselves over the
other social groups and the African looked to the colonial office for pro¬
tection to almost the diametrically opposite situation.
33ibid.. p. 6
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Summing up the political impact of Mau Mau the first point to be noted
is that not only do the racial fears and tension created by Mau Mau still
exist but echos of Mau Mau itself continues to be heard even today. For
example, in June I960 a loyal Kikuyu chief was murdered in Mau Mau style.
Other organizations on the Mau Mau pattern have been uncovered since 1956.
Statements such as that by S. A. Ayondo (a LUO member of the Legislative
Council) that "when Mau Mau is properly appraised it will rank in history
•a/i
with the French Revolution or the War of American Independence."*^
The significance of the tribal tensions exhibited in the KADU-KANU
disagreement shows that the political culture of Kenya cannot be over
estimated. Although not created by Mau Mau, this tribal split was
certainly increased by the tensions of the emergency.
Finally, vi1lagization wi 11 especially, if it spreads to other tribes,
which I highly doubt, who live in the old Kikuyu patterns have largely
unpredictable but certainly far reaching social, political and economic
repercussions.
^^imes. Vol. 75, (June 13» I960), p. 31
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: MAU HAU REFLECTION ON POLITICAL
ROLE OF VIOLENCE
This chapter cannot hope to examine the entire question of the rela¬
tionship between violence and politics. Rather this relationship will be
briefly analyzed in the context of "irregular" warfare both in general
theory and as found in Kenya.
Referring back for a moment to questions often asked and relating
them to what I witnessed and what we have learned in this study of Hau
Mau, it seems that three roughly concentric and closely related circles
of analysis should be considered. First, there is Hau Hau itself -- what
was it; how did it operate; what did it seek? Second, there is Kenya —
what were the interactions between the social and political structure
of Kenya and Hau Mau and more especially what was the political impact of
Hau Hau on Kenya. Third the broader, more theoretical circle of political
violence in general — what can be learned about this theoretical plane
from a study of Hau Hau. It must of course be recognized that conclusions
based on only one study (and in the case of Hau Hau a study with informa¬
tion derived mainly from one side of the conflict) must be highly tenta¬
tive. This is especially true as we move from the specific, Hau Hau and
Kenya, to the more general, the nature and function of political violence.




In theoretical studies of irregular war the first point usually made,
and with great emphasis, is the necessity of gaining the support of the
local population (masses) and of adjusting to special local conditions.
However, all too often these same studies then forget their own warning
and go on to describe military operations in a vacuum. The social con¬
text (that is, the relations between the groups in the society, their
internal structure, and their general outlook) is the most important
factor in determining: first, whether widespread violence will occur;
second, whether violence with political motives will take place; and
third, how such violence can be effectively combatted if it does occur.
All too often studies become enamored of war as a "pure art" and forget
that "war is a social phenomenon" and that "the limits within which poli¬
tical violence may take place are set just as much by social considera¬
tions as by such material factors as the number of men available, types
of weapons, and so forth.
In discussing the political role of violence in Kenya, consideration
must be given to the question of what is violence and, more particularly,
what is political violence. Violence (about which reams of philosophi¬
cal speculation could, and have, been written) may be simply defined as
the infliction of bodily harm and possibly, depending on the culture,
property damage or social damage or extreme loss of face. Note that this
definition of "violence" as opposed to political violence is so broad
^Harry Holbert Turney-High, Primitive War (Columbia University of
South Carolina Press, 1949), p. 200.
^Violence—exertion of any physical force...Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., 1966), p. 2554.
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as to include many "normal” criminal activities. Perception may play an
important role in violence. If a potential victim feels a proximate threat
of violence that feeling of being threatened can have a significant bearing
on his conduct.
When does violence become political violence? In answering this ques¬
tion the social context is all important. In a very loosely organized
society with practically no political organization there may be a great
deal of violence (in fact it is highly likely that there wi11 be) but
little of it is intended or perceived as political. In a very high organ¬
ized social structure (e.g. the Soviet Union) violence may be minimal,
but is almost always considered to have political overtones. However,
it is in the bcoad area between these extremes that problem in defining
political violence arises.
Perhaps it is a positive correlation of intent and perception which
results in violence being political violence. If the initiator of the
violence seeks broadly political goals and those who form the social con¬
text in which he is acting generally recognize such political aspects then
the action can be called political violence.
In Kenya, the Mau Mau goals, less defined as they were, were political
in many of their aspects, and, in spite of efforts to brand Mau Mau as
merely "thugs" there were in general, even if reluctant on the part of
the settlers, recognition that the Mau Mau sought a political end. Thus
intent and perception merged and the conditions of "political" violence
were met.
Political violence can occur in either an international or intra¬
national setting (or a setting combining these elements, as does the
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struggle for South Vietnam). The two basic settings reflect the two basic
patterns of competition described by Huntington:
. , . two general types of competitive situation can be
distinguished: those in which the two parties interact
directly and attempt to secure their aims by strengthening
themselves and reducing the strength of their opponents
and those in which the two contestants compete indirectly
by attempting to win for themselves the support of third
parties. . .
The second pattern of activity is that reflected in domes¬
tic politics and political violence on the intranational
plane takes on the same form. In an insurrectionary war
the government and a counterelite (the revolutionary) are in
a competition for the support of a significant part of the
population. The basic tools of the counterelite in this
struggle for support are terrorism and persuasion.3
The Mau Mau used both the tools of terrorism and persuasion, parti¬
cularly the former. Prior to the emergency the combined use of terror
and persuasion was roost evident in the technique used to recruit and
hold converts. The oath and methods used to force individuals to take
them reflected a use of terror and persuasion well adapted to Kikuyuland.
However, beyond terror in an insurrection lies wider scale, more for¬
mally organized and more firmly based guerrilla warfare and finally,
unless the opponent collapses, an almost "conventional" war. Hau Mau
never moved out of the terrorist phase due to the primary factors: the
sociological background of the Kikuyu, lack of effective outside support,
and the combination of determination and flexibility shown by the authori¬
ties.
Turney-High in his study of "Primitive War" constantly emphasizes
^Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics,"
in Changing Patterns of Military Politics (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1962), pp. 20-21.
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the lack of a coherent leadership structure which would enforce effective
obedience as a major feature of "primitive war." Among the Kikuyu authority
was weak even before the white man came, and was not a warlike tribe. "It
seems that in Kikuyuland, authority lacked strength. Its reinforcement
by supernatural powers and by the influence of positive religion was re1a>
tively weak."^
In spite of the efforts of the British to create a leadership of
chiefs and headmen the result of contact between the Kikuyu and the white
man followed the pattern of indirect rules as described by Thomas and
Znaniecki in their studies: 'Vhen. . . the primary group (which has been
in a less static situation) is brought rapidly into contact with the out¬
side world with its new and rival schemes, the entire old organization
is apt to break down at once. . . and the individual ... is apt to
5
become completely disorganized in the new conditions."
It should be noted however, that many of the best Mau Mau leaders
were Kikuyu who had had some contact with the British Army in World War
II. However, these men had learned in the army only a part of one aspect
of the culture of the Europeans and it was an insufficient base on which
to build an effective leadership either of the entire tribe or of the
terrorists (freedom fighters).
Mau Mau's lack of outside support and/or a secure base area was
another reason for its failure to graduate from terrorism to guerrilla
warfare. Theorists and practitioners of irregular warfare (e.g. Castro, Mao,
Carothers, op. cit.. p. 5.
William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, "On Disorganization and
Reorganization," in Talcott Parson, et al.. Theories of Society. (Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1961), p, 1293*
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or Che) have all emphasized the guerrillas need for either outside sup¬
port or a secure base area in order to be most effective. Mau Mau had
neither of these factors in its favor. Material and outside support as
was evidenced in guerrilla actions in Israel, Algeria, Cyprus and as it is
now evidenced today in South Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau,
was completely lacking, although incentive was there, in Kenya. Mau Mau
did not have any obvious outside allies who would have actually provided
significant aid had there been opportunity to do so. In addition, even
if aid had been available, Mau Mau did not (and because of its tribal base
could not) operate near the Kenya frontiers or near the seacoast. In
addition to this, the general political situation in East Africa at the
time, which made all of Kenya's neighbors unlikely channels of aid to Mau
Mau becomes very clear why Mau Mau suffered from material anemia.
Mau Mau was also sadly lacking in secure base areas. There was no
area "controlled" by Mau Mau that the security forces could not enter at
will or bomb the area, particularly after the first few months of the
emergency. While the guerrilla had freedom of movement in the mountains,
they did have to keep moving to a great extent and therefore could not
establish even rudimentary training or supply bases. The attempt to use
Mau Mau supporters in Nairobi both as a source of "outside" supply and as
a base area was partially successful until Mau Mau in the capital was all
but annihilated by Operation Anvil in 1954 discussed earlier.
In spite of Mau Mau handicaps it might still have won a more direct
or immediate victory or its defeat might have been much more difficult
if it had faced a bungling opponent. However, in spite of a fair quota
of military and political false starts and missteps the British were able
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to pursue a policy which eventually neutralized the violence of Mau Mau
and yet brought about majority rule with reasonable speed. The fact that
final authority, particularly In the political sphere, lay In London rather
than In Nairobi was a major factor In this success.
"The more detached a government Is from the society disrupted by
revolutionary war, the more able It will be to surmount these obstacles."^
As a result It Is frequently easy for an Imperial government to make
concessions that an Indigenous government would never consider. In view
of the attitudes frequently expressed by the European settlers during the
emergency and In subsequent elections prior to Independence, It Is doubtful
developments In Kenya would have been so constructive as has been the case
had they been In full command of decision making In the early 1950's.
Terrorism is a two-edged sword. Indiscriminate use can do its Initia¬
tors more harm than good In the long-run. The three factors described
above forced Mau Mau to turn most of Its effort against Africans rather
than Europeans. Mau Mau's organization and support was never firm enough
for them to move to more selective terrorism or more Intensified guerrilla
warfare. Brian Crozier comments: ". . . terrorists tend to fail when
(they) devote their main efforts to bringing their own side to heel."^
The scale of political violence Is great — from a rock throwing and
embassy window breaking to an attack on an Isolated police outpost or to
thermonuclear devastation. Yet In spite of Its crude and untrained nature
^Hunt Ington, op. cit., 31*
^Brlan Crozier, The Rebel (London: Chatto-WIndows, I960), p. 12.
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Mau Mau belongs on that scale. For more than three years an organiza¬
tion (using the term organization in the broadest possible sense) with
small numbers, miserable (home made) weapons and uncoordinated leadership
was able to stand off the vastly superior forces sent against it and
revolutionized the political and social aspects of Kenya. Why? Because
they were able to exploit terrorism and fear, and more important, the
social situation in Kenya.
The Mau Mau operated in two broad, interacting social contexts, Kenya
and the rest of the world. In Kenya fear and desperation led the bulk of
the Kikuyu to support Mau Mau and it was not until the social context which
had spawned Mau Mau was completely overturned by the progress of villagiza-
tion that Mau Mau support in Kenya was decisively undercut. Vi 1lagization,
which was introduced primarily as a military weapon was a powerful social
weapon as well. By creating a new social framework and a new basis of
hope, vi1lagization weakened the force of social despair on which Mau Mau
fed.
The world social context was also a factor influencing events in
Kenya. The British were restricted in the measures they could take both
by pressure in Britain and throughout the world.
"In broad perspective Mau Mau cannot be regarded simply as a terrorist
insurrection by an element of a politically preconcious tribe, for it
draws its strength and inspiration from the whole of the world's anti¬
colonial forces."®
To assert that the social context (combined perhaps, if one is so
p
Rawcliffe, op. cit.. I38.
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inclined, with the factor of the inherent shortcomings of man) is all
important in determining the existence, nature, and impact of political
violence is certainly not an original position but it points toward some
interesting conclusions.
First, while the social context which was the underlying cause of
Mau Mau exists, with some variation, in many parts of Africa and therefore
a continued possibility of more Mau Mau-like violence exists, nowhere
would direct outside influence be as completely lacking as in Kenya in
the early 1950's. Thus the crude (if allowed to say) pattern of Mau Mau
is not likely to be repeated by any movement entertaining serious poli¬
tical or social goals.
The second conclusion applies more specifically to Kenya. It is
possible that if political violence again occurs in Kenya vi1lagisation
may have given the Kikuyu a much improved basis for violent action. As
a society becomes more integrated and better organized there would tend
to be less unorganized and sporadic violence because of government control.
But while a well integrated and organized society may engage in less vio¬
lence, where there is occasion for political violence such a society can
undertake it more efficiently and with greater prospects for success.
The third, and widest circle of analysis mentioned above, in draw¬
ing analysis between political violence in different situations, the social
differences must always be kept in the forefront, not merely asserted and
then forgotten. Applying a Kenyan frame of reference to Vietnanx or Angola
will not be successful unless the social and political situation is sub¬
stantially the same.
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If there are "rules" of unconventional war Mau Mau, with its lack
of outside support and its generally poor organization, probably serves
as "the exception that prove the 'rules'."
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